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ABSTRACT	  	  
The relationship of adaptive and pathological narcissism to attachment style and reflective 
functioning 
by 
Petra C. Vospernik 
Adviser: Diana Diamond, PhD 
This study examined the relationship of adaptive and pathological (grandiose and 
vulnerable) expressions of narcissism to attachment style and the capacity for reflective 
functioning (RF). Narcissism serves a relevant personality construct in clinical theory, social 
psychology and psychiatry but remains inconsistently defined across these disciplines. 
Theoretical accounts support the notion that attachment difficulties and maladaptive patterns of 
mentally representing self and others serve as the substrates for narcissistic pathology but are less 
pronounced in adaptive narcissism. A multiple regression analysis was conducted in a college 
student sample of 345 participants applying a cross-sectional, survey design. It was hypothesized 
that pathological narcissism (grandiose or vulnerable) is associated with higher degrees of 
attachment-related anxiety and avoidance and lower levels of RF than is adaptive narcissism.  
Results: With respect to convergent validity, measures of adaptive and pathological 
narcissism exhibited a differential pattern of correlations to general psychopathology, thereby 
supporting the notion that distinct constructs crystallize within narcissism’s heterogeneity. 
Multiple regression analysis confirmed the two-component structure of pathological narcissism 
representing narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability. Narcissistic vulnerability 
significantly predicted higher levels of attachment anxiety, an effect that remained after 
controlling for narcissistic grandiosity and adaptive narcissism.  In contrast, adaptive narcissism 
	   v	  
significantly predicted lower levels of attachment anxiety. Contrary to expectation, this effect 
was not observed for avoidant attachment, i.e. pathological narcissism was not found to be a 
stronger predictor of avoidant attachment than adaptive narcissism. This study further found that 
pathological narcissism was not a stronger predictor of poor reflective functioning than was 
adaptive narcissism. In sum, these findings illustrate how overall psychopathology and 
attachment anxiety vary across the three narcissistic expressions, thereby weakening narcissism’s 
clinical utility as currently defined in the DSM-5. Theoretical and treatment implications are also 
reviewed.  	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CHAPTER 1: INTRODCUTION 
Concepts of narcissism span the continuum from adaptive to pathological and find 
meaningful expressions in both clinical and nonclinical populations. There is a growing concern 
that narcissism contributes to problematic societal phenomena, including the inability to form 
and sustain enduring relationships, as well as corporate malfeasance and the cult of celebrity 
(Ronningstam, 2011; Pincus, 2011; Diamond, 2005). Traditionally, research on trait narcissism 
has been subsumed under the field of social psychology whereas pathological narcissism, or 
narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), has been studied predominantly through psychiatric and 
psychological case reports as well as psychoanalytic theory (Kernberg & Caligor, 2005; 
Ronningstam, 2005). In an attempt to improve NPD’s clinical utility, the DSM-5 personality 
disorders work group developed a dimensional system aimed at integrating empirically based 
criteria with essential features in the clinical realm of personality functioning (DSM-5 Section III, 
American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Following the inclusion of NPD as a discrete diagnostic category into the third edition of 
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-III, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980), clinical interest and theory construction in narcissistic pathology have 
engendered a prolific output of comprehensive reviews of pathological narcissism (Pincus & 
Lukowitsky, 2010; Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2008; Levy, Reynoso,	  Wasserman,	  &	  Clarkin, 2007; 
Ronningstam, 2005, 2009; Ronningstam & Gunderson, 1990; Wink, 1991).  However, when this 
long- standing interest in the clinical concept of narcissism is contrasted with the actual number 
of empirically orientated research studies on NPD, the imbalance is striking.  A recent meta-
analysis of the existing empirical literature on NPD found that more than 80 percent of peer-
reviewed publications with “narcissistic personality disorder” in their title were either theoretical 
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in nature or reviews of existing research in which no new data were presented (61%), or 
presentations of N-of-one case studies (19.5%) (Miller & Campbell, 2010). In light of relevant 
conceptual overlaps between NPD and borderline personality disorder (BPD), it is particularly 
relevant to contrast the above findings with existing research on BPD for this study. While BPD 
engendered an equally large amount of theory construction, it has additionally attracted sizable 
resources for funding empirical research on its etiological basis, including newly available 
neurobiological and genetic technologies. The establishment of several parent advocacy groups 
(most notably the National Education Alliance for Borderline Personality Disorder) and the 
Borderline Personality Disorder Research Foundation set up by a bereaved Swiss family led to 
the adoption of BPD by major mental health organizations such as the National Alliance of 
Mental Health, the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH), and even the US Congress 
(Gunderson, 2009). Against this background, BPD has achieved higher legitimacy as a subject 
for scientific study and for public awareness than NPD during the past decade.  
  The tendency of privileging pathological narcissism theory construction over empirical 
research has been widely considered as an indicator of NPD’s underlying construct ambiguity 
(Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2008; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Watson, 2005). However, as long as the 
nomological network of narcissistic pathology remains speculative in nature, efforts to 
synthesize clinical descriptions and empirical data will remain largely futile. From a clinical 
standpoint, the existing lack of validation studies creates a worrisome situation given that 
pathological narcissism has been associated with significant functional impairments and 
psychopathology, including DSM Axis I disorders (Tritt, Ryder, Ring, & Pincus, 2010; Stinson 
et al., 2008; Ronningstam, 1996, 1998), psychopathy (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Ronningstam, 
2005), relational dysfunction (Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; Campbell, Foster & Finkel, 2002), 
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aggression (Baumeister, Bushman, & Campbell, 2000), substance abuse (Luhtanen & Crocker, 
2005) and suicidal behaviors (Ronningstam & Maltsberger, 1998; Ronningstam, Weinberg, & 
Maltsberger, 2008).  
The DSM-5 Personality and Personality Disorder Work Group established empirically 
based criteria in order to enable clinicians to perform dimensional ratings on personality traits. 
The original proposal introduced two scales of impairments in “personality functioning” relating 
to an individual’s interpersonal interactions and sense of self. In addition, patients would be rated 
on five pathological personality traits, for narcissism the relevant traits included antagonism and 
impulsivity (DSM-5, Section III, APA 2013). Two factors have contributed to these suggested 
revisions of the DSM-IV diagnostic criteria: One is today’s growing support for dimensional trait 
models and measures of personality psychopathology in general (Siever & Weinstein, 2009; 
Widiger & Trull, 2007; Widiger, Simonsen, Krueger, Livesley, & Verheul 2005; Trull & Durrett, 
2005) and the second impetus was provided by the existing dearth of narcissism validation 
studies in particular. Some clinicians, however, criticized the DSM-5 personality disorder 
proposal as too complex and not user-friendly from a clinical perspective. Following the heated 
debate between pro-dimensional and pro-categorical proponents of the DSM revisions, the 
Personality and Personality Disorder Work Group came up with the following compromise. It 
was decided to include the new trait-specific methodology in DSM-5 Section III to encourage 
further study on how this system could be applied to improve diagnoses of personality disorders 
in clinical practice.   It is therefore highly opportune to gather empirical evidence on the level of 
impairment in personality functioning (self and interpersonal) of individuals exhibiting 
pathological trait narcissism.   
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Applying the concepts of attachment theory and reflective functioning (RF) to narcissistic 
pathology is particularly relevant as a substantive body of literature demonstrates that 
maladaptive patterns of mentally representing self and others serve as substrates for personality 
psychopathology (for a detailed review see Bender, Morey, & Sokol, 2011).  Concepts of self-
other representational disturbance have long been present in theories of personality pathology. 
Notably, Kernberg’s (1984) structural theory of borderline organization identifies the quality of 
object relations as well as the quality of the representations of self and other along with identity 
diffusion as the crucial factors.  
Through its explicit assertion that, “personality psychopathology fundamentally emanates 
from disturbances in thinking about self and others” (Skodol et al., 2011, p.5), the DSM-5 
proposal recognizes the prominent roles of mentalization (reflective functioning) and self- as 
well as interpersonal emotion regulation mechanisms in contemporary psychodynamic theories 
(Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy & Target, 1997; Blatt, 2008; Kernberg & Caligor, 2005; Levy, Meehan, 
Kelly, Reynoso, Weber, Clarkin & Kernberg, 2006). Of course, concepts of self and 
interpersonal functioning are not limited to psychodynamic thinking, but are common to a 
number of conceptualizations, including social-cognitive (Andersen & Cole, 1990; Andersen & 
Chen, 2002), cognitive-behavioral (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) as well as trait (Cloninger, 2000; 
Livesley, 2003) approaches.   
 
Statement of the Problem and Significance of Study  
In line with the existing literature on narcissism conceptualization (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 
2010, Levy, Chauhan, Clarkin, Wasserman & Reynoso, 2009; Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2008; 
Ronningstam 2011, 2009), this study posits the existence of a tripartite structure of narcissism, 
comprised of adaptive as well as pathological elements (grandiose and vulnerable).  The current 
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study will assess the relationship of these three distinct narcissistic expressions (grandiose, 
vulnerable, adaptive) to attachment and the capacity for mentalization (RF).  More specifically, 
the study examines the interrelations among vulnerable narcissism, grandiose narcissism and 
adaptive narcissism as assessed by the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) and the 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI). The characteristics of the three types of narcissism 
(grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) will be further explored by examining their relationship to self-
report measures of adult attachment status (Relationship Questionnaire, RQ) and the capacity for 
mentalization (The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire, RFQ). 
Individuals with personality pathology are often associated with insecure attachment 
status (e.g. Bender, Farber, & Geller, 1997; West, Keller, Links & Patrick, 1993; West & 
Sheldon-Keller, 1994). Also, impairments in RF have been indicators of psychiatric disturbances 
and greater interpersonal and attachment difficulties (Fonagy & Bateman, 2008; Fonagy et al., 
1996; Slade, 2005). It is therefore highly relevant for a better diagnostic assessment of 
narcissistic personality pathology to establish how individuals who represent different types of 
narcissism (grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) differ in their adult attachment status and their 
capacity for mentalization (RF).  This is also a very timely project as the newly effective DSM-5 
introduces a dimensional measure of personality pathology based on deficits in representations of 
self and others as a mandatory part of personality assessment in its Section III “Emerging 
Measures and Models.” 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
The present study assesses the relationship of three distinct narcissistic expressions 
(grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) to attachment style and the capacity for mentalization (RF).  
The literature review is presented in five sections, beginning with the conceptual distinction 
between narcissistic personality pathology and normative narcissism. This includes a review of 
both the normal and pathological expressions of the construct and a discussion of the limitations 
of the diagnostic criteria of narcissistic personality disorder (NPD) as derived from clinical 
observation and theoretical conceptualization. The next section takes a closer look at the 
operationalization of narcissism by analyzing and integrating the empirical research on 
pathological and normative narcissism and its utilization of available research methods. The third 
section provides a description and rationale of the reformulation of personality disorders in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM) with particular emphasis on the 
proposed changes for narcissistic personality disorder. Implications for clinical assessment and 
diagnosis are being discussed. In the fourth section, an argument is made for the relationship 
between the development of narcissistic personality pathology and impairments in the underlying 
attachment organization. This section provides a review and critical examination of the clinical 
applications of attachment theory both theoretically and empirically. The final section analyzes 
the maladaptive ways in which impairments in mentalization (RF) and narcissistic personality 
psychopathology interact. Following the presentation of the theoretical basis for mentalization, 
this section reviews developmental, social-cognitive and affect concepts of RF and reviews 
empirical research documenting the relationship of RF to personality pathology in general and 
narcissism in particular.   
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1. Narcissistic personality pathology versus normative narcissism 
Origins of pathological narcissism  
Narcissism as a psychiatric construct dates back to Havelock Ellis (1898) who was the 
first to coin the “Narcissus-like” tendency to absorb sexual feelings into self-admiration. In “On 
Narcissism” (1914/1957), Freud’s seminal paper on the subject, excessive self-love was tied to 
the development of a pathological ego-ideal serving to maintain self-preservation and self-regard. 
Subsequently, psychoanalytic theory on narcissism shifted its focus towards secondary 
narcissism, which was presumed to occur due to frustration by the environment, most 
importantly disturbances in the early relationship between the infant and its caregiver (Balint, 
1960, Rosenfeld, 1964; Lewin, 1954).   
As psychoanalytic writing began to progressively move away from strictly drive based 
assumptions, theories that differentiated between healthy and pathological forms of self-esteem 
regulation, added considerably to the understanding of narcissism (Horney, 1939; Reich, 1960).  
With the advance of Kohut’s self psychology (1971, 1977), the failure to self-regulate one’s own 
emotional state was increasingly seen as the core pathology of narcissistic patients. Kohut 
introduced the term ‘narcissistic injury’ as a clinical description of a highly negatively charged 
affective state that is triggered by feelings of inadequacy (1971). 
Kernberg (1967) whose work is based on a structural model of personality, placed the 
emphasis on the narcissistic personality structure as it is embedded within a broader borderline 
personality organization. Due to the presence of superego pathology, the narcissistic individual 
invests in an abnormal grandiose self, based on primitive and ideal self representations. Drawing 
on early object relations theory, the pathological narcissist is conceptualized as defensively 
avoiding negative aspects of the self by splitting off or projecting devalued or aggressively 
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determined self- and object representations (Kernberg, 1984). Kernberg views the severity of 
pathological narcissism as ranging from mild to malignant depending on the level of ego-
syntonic aggression embedded within the personality structure (Kernberg & Caligor, 2005).  
Together, these two portraits confirm empirical findings on the pronounced dimensions of the 
narcissistic pathology spectrum, with Kernberg emphasizing one end of the continuum as the 
“unbridled grandiosity of these patients, their ruthless exploitation of others, and their emotional 
coldness and shallowness” and Kohut the other end, by drawing attention to the narcissistic 
individual’s “painful timidity and preoccupation with secret grandiose fantasies” (Diamond, 
2005, p. 260). 
 
Original considerations on normative narcissism  
The notion that narcissism is not an inherently pathological construct but also includes 
adaptive components, has been promoted by the writings of Heinz Kohut (1977). Moving away 
from more traditional Freudian assumptions, Kohut narrowed the gap between adaptive and 
pathological narcissism by emphasizing their common roots. He writes, “Behind the seeming 
importance of a child’s overstimulation and conflicts with regard to his observations of parental 
sexual intercourse, for example, lies the much more important absence of the parents’ empathic 
responses to the child’s need to be mirrored and to find a target for his idealization” (1977, 
p.187).  According to Kohut’s theory, a child’s self emerges as a bipolar structure, with the 
“cohesive grandiose-exhibitionist self” on the one hand, and the “cohesive idealized parent-
imago” on the other (1977, p.185).  The emerging nature of this nuclear bipolar self then 
becomes a function of the parents’ ability to be attuned to their child’s psychological state. Thus 
in a healthy development, marked by parental empathetic capacity, the child’s self moves from 
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the original immature grandiosity to an adult goal-directed assertiveness. With respect to the 
other, the idealized parental “selfobject” changes from a state of dependent submissiveness into 
the mature ability to recognize and value accomplishments of others. Kohut (1977) posits that 
only the chronic incapacity to respond appropriately to the child’s needs, results in a pathological 
development. In this scenario, the child is forced to compensate for the loss of external empathic 
reactions by employing what Kohut termed “transmuting internalizations,” which convert failed 
“selfobject functions” into independent but aggrandized “self-functions.” As a consequence, the 
narcissistic adult draws on maladaptive strategies that serve as self-preservative responses to 
ward off feelings of inadequacy.  In short, according to Kohut (1971, 1977) pathological 
narcissism results from developmental deficits in the normal progression of the self, whereas 
normative narcissism is primitive grandiosity matured into confident assertiveness and high self-
esteem.  
Kernberg (1975), in contrast, offers a conceptual distinction between normal and 
pathological narcissism in terms of an intrapsychic structure consisting of multiple self 
representations and their related affect. Following Hartmann (1950), Kernberg (1975) defines 
normal narcissism as the libidinal investment of the self but with the caveat that such a libidinal 
investment of the self does not only stem from an instinctual source of libidinal energy. Crucial 
to Kernberg’s theory is that the self “actually constitutes a structure that integrates libidinally 
invested as well as aggressively invested components” (1975, p.316). Consequently, the 
regulation of normal narcissism can be best understood in terms of a self-concept that integrates 
rather than dissociates libidinal and aggressive aspects of the self.  
Ronningstam (2005), in keeping with her focus on self-esteem and affect regulation, 
distinguishes healthy from pathological narcissism by the degree to which self-esteem serves to 
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protect and support a grandiose but fragile self and affect regulation is compromised by 
difficulties in modulating emotions, particularly anger, shame and envy. Yet, Ronningstam 
concedes that “vicissitudes between healthy and more or less severe pathological narcissism are 
constantly present, and the coexistence of and intertwined interaction between healthy and 
pathological aspects of narcissistic functioning can make it specifically challenging to identify 
and understand the narcissistic personality” (2005, p. 71).   
  The complexities resulting from the co-occurrence of adaptive and maladaptive features 
of narcissism are a central theme of the present study and will be more closely assessed by 
exploring the following issues: (i) the nature of the ‘normative versus pathological’ divide, (ii) 
empirical findings on adaptive narcissism and (iii) the implications for the clinical use of existing 
narcissism measures.  
 
Normative narcissism versus narcissistic pathology: One continuum or two distinct dimensions 
There has been a considerable amount of debate on the bifurcate nature of normative and 
pathological narcissism in the clinical and theoretical literature. Traditionally, clinical 
investigators, researchers and theorists have included both normal and pathological 
characteristics in their narcissism constructs reflecting aspects of adaptive and maladaptive 
personality organization (Kohut, 1977; Kernberg, 1984,1998; Emmons, 1984; Wink, 1991; 
Watson, 2005; Ronningstam, 2009; Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010).  
However, there is still a sizable divide over the question whether normative and 
pathological narcissism lie on a single continuum from healthy self-esteem to severe narcissistic 
pathology or rather constitute two potentially distinct personality dimensions in the form of 
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adaptive and pathological narcissism. In other words, whether an individual’s expression of 
narcissism is a matter of degree or type. 
Cain, Pincus and Ansell (2008) support the notion of normal and pathological narcissism 
as two distinct expressions of personality with the former being more commonly assessed in 
social-personality psychology research, and the latter more commonly assessed in clinical 
research and practice. While this view allows for a more clearly delineated application of 
available measures of narcissistic personality traits (NPI for social psychology and PNI for 
clinical psychology), it suggests a reductionist approach to personality traits as clearly 
dividable/separable into healthy and pathological dimensions.  
Today, the majority of theorists and clinical researchers view narcissism on a continuum 
ranging from healthy aspects of self-promotion to pathological expressions reflecting 
maladaptive personality organization and regulatory mechanisms (e.g. Russ, Shedler, Bradley, & 
Westen, 2008; Ronningstam, 2005; Watson, 2005; pro-dimensional authors). This predominant 
view is representative of the latest proposed revisions of the personality disorder classification in 
the DSM (APA, 2011). The “acknowledgement of the continuous nature of personality and 
personality disorder” as stated on the official APA website (APA, 2011) has been considered as 
one of the key rationales for the proposed dimensional diagnostic system for personality disorder. 
In particular, granting clinicians the option of generating a personality trait profile for all of their 
patients and not just those with a personality disorder diagnosis is seen as an important 
achievement by the DSM-5 drafting committee (APA, 2012; Krueger, Eaton, South, Clark, & 
Simms, 2011).  
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Empirical associations of normative and pathological narcissism 
Aiming at a neutral definition, Pincus et al. (2009) conceptualized narcissism as “one’s 
capacity to maintain a relatively positive self-image through a variety of self-, affect-, and field-
regulatory processes, underlying the individual’s need for validation and affirmation as well as 
the motivation to overtly and covertly seek out self-enhancement experiences from the social 
environment” (p.365). According to this conceptualization, an individual who is operating within 
the normative range of narcissism is adept at making age and context appropriate provisions to 
maintain self-cohesion and a realistic level of self-esteem by eliciting confirming responses from 
the environment. 
However, the distinction between normal narcissistic needs and motives and their 
pathological expression is not only a function of the degree to which the individual depends on 
external validation and affirmation but also gets reflected by the individual’s flexibility to access 
inner resources when faced with disappointments.  In this regard, pathological narcissism is 
marked by significant regulatory deficits and maladaptive strategies making it hard to cope with 
real or imagined threats to positive self-esteem (Ronningstam 2005; Kernberg, 1984, 1998; 
Kohut, 1971, 1977). Research conducted by Morf and Rhodewalt, (2001) demonstrated that 
individuals with high scores on the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 
1988) are overly invested in promoting their self-perceived superiority and at the same time 
hypervigilant toward detecting a better performing other. 
The self-regulation theory of narcissistic functioning thus suggests a workable but 
precarious way of being in the world. On the one hand, a stable positive sense of self promotes 
mental health, however, this effect is lessened if it becomes a contingency of an external factor, 
in this case the constant flow of validation and affirmation from the social environment and 
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interpersonal relationships. Traditionally, theory and research in personality and social 
psychology have entertained the hypothesis of a negative relation between narcissism and mental 
health. For example, Bushman and Baumeister (1998) found that high NPI scores are correlated 
with controlling behavior and intense anger and aggression in case of unmet expectations. Paulus 
and Williams (2002) reported an overlap with measures of psychopathy and Machiavellianism. 
Other studies found narcissists to be jealous and fearful of closeness (Rhodewalt, 2009), 
distrusting, suspiscious and controlling of others (Davidov & Morf, 2004) as well as adopting an 
interactive style marked by hostility (Paulhus, 1998).  
By contrast, repeated findings of narcissism’s strong relation to self-esteem, a crucial 
mediator predictive of mental health, support the hypothesis of a healthy or adaptive form of 
narcissism (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikis, 2002; Kernis & Sun, 1994; Raskin & Terry, 1998; 
Rhodewalt, Madrian, & Cheney, 1998; Raskin, Novacek & Hogan, 1991; Emmons, 1987). 
Similarly, the majority of empirical research on narcissism and depression points to a mutual 
exclusion of these characteristics within the same individual.   For example, Rathvon and 
Holmstrom (1996) posit that narcissism is a defense against a primary depression and Sedikides 
et al. (2004) found an inverse relationship between depression and narcissism (but see Tritt et al., 
2010, for a study that differentiates between vulnerable and grandiose subtypes correlations).  
Narcissism in non-clinical populations is also positively related to measures indicative of better 
adjustment and subjective well-being (Rose, 2002) and inversely related to anxiety (Watson & 
Biderman, 1993). In an attempt to parse apart the two main components of narcissism, overly 
high self-regard and using others for self-promotion, a longitudinal study by Zuckerman and 
O’Loughlin (2009) found that if the self-esteem portion is high, but no significant interpersonal 
exploitation takes place, narcissism seems to promote overall well-being and mental health.  
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Clinical utility and pathological narcissism 
NPD’s low score on clinical utility may be attributed to its unevenly distributed prevalence 
rates across populations, with estimates being the lowest for community samples.  The Baltimore 
Epidemiological Catchment area study, for example, found that only 0.1% of the population met 
criteria for NPD (Samuels et al., 2002). In contrast, Zimmerman, Rothschild and Chelminski 
(2005) found a prevalence of 2.3% in psychiatric outpatients. Studies that survey clinicians 
indicate that the likelihood of receiving a diagnosis of NPD in an outpatient private practice 
setting is much higher than in hospital in- or outpatient departments (Westen, 1997; Doidge, 
Simon & Brauer, 2002). This variation in prevalence rates between populations might be 
reflective of the fact that narcissistic patients are more likely to be hospitalized when they are in 
a vulnerable self-state. Relying solely on DSM-IV ‘grandiose’ NPD may therefore impede 
clinical recognition of pathological narcissism (Pincus, Ansell et al., 2009).  
Results from the 2004-2005 Wave 2 NESARC study on prevalence, correlates, disability, 
and comorbidity of DSM-IV narcissistic personality disorder confirm that NPD is a prevalent 
personality disorder in the general U.S. population and is associated with considerable disability 
among men, whose rates exceed those of women. In the total NESARC sample, the prevalence 
of NPD was 6.2%, 7.7% among men and 4.8% among women (NESARC Wave 2, Grant et al., 
2004).  Nevertheless, the study concludes that NPD may not be as stable as previously 
recognized or described in the DSM-IV. The results highlight the need for further research from 
numerous perspectives to identify the unique and common genetic and environmental factors 
underlying the disorder-specific associations with NPD observed in this study (Stinson et al., 
2008). 
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Construct validity and pathological narcissism 
Narcissism’s criterion problems, such as its heterogeneity with regard to symptoms and traits, 
its phenotypic range and high comorbidity with other personality disorders, have limited and 
confounded validity research (Ronningstam, 2009, Trull & Durrett, 2005; Pincus et al., 2009). In 
contrast, recent studies on the expansion of the validity include investigations of the broader 
construct of pathological narcissism as well as narcissistic personality traits in the general 
population and provide significant evidence for validity (Miller & Campbell, 2010). 
 
In sum, certain characteristics of narcissism, such as high self-esteem and high agency, 
are indicators of better adjustment (Saragovi, Aube, Koestner, & Zuroff, 2002), whereas others, 
especially the coupling of interpersonal exploitation with interpersonal vulnerability point in the 
opposite direction (Rhodewalt & Morf, 2005).  It follows that in concurrent analysis, enhanced 
levels of narcissism are related to both maladaptive functioning as well as to indices of better 
mental health.  
This inherent ambiguity of the narcissism construct is largely responsible for the 
controversy with regards to the structural validity of pathological narcissism. One of the 
problems is that existing studies have been mainly concerned with distinct phenotypic 
descriptions of narcissism (“self-importance,” “entitlement,”). The phenomenology of narcissism 
in and of itself, however, is only a partial indicator for a clinical manifestation of personality 
pathology. Personality pathology is defined by broader themes of dysfunction, identified by 
contemporary psychodynamic and interpersonal theory as degrees of disturbance of the self and 
interpersonal domains (Blatt, 2008; Kernberg & Caligor, 2005). 
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What is therefore missing from the existing literature on narcissism is a demonstration of 
the interaction between self and interpersonal functioning on the one hand and descriptive 
narcissistic criteria on the other hand.  The present study aims to illustrate the dual nature of 
narcissism  (adaptive/normative and maladaptive/pathological) through distinct self and other 
correlates. It is expected that pathological narcissism will show stronger covariation with greater 
degrees of disturbances of the self and interpersonal domains.   
The present study’s aim converges with the DSM-5 Personality Task Force proposal 
which promotes “a two-step diagnostic process” that distinguishes between “significant 
impairment in self and interpersonal functioning” (Step 1) and the presence of “pathological 
personality traits in one or more trait domains” (Step 2) (APA, 2012). A more detailed review of 
the DSM-5 Personality Disorders Proposal will follow in Section 3 below.   
 
2. The operationalization of narcissism 
 
Measuring normative versus pathological narcissism  
For the past three decades, narcissism research has been dominated by the use of the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI; Raskin & Hall, 1979, 1981). Developed in parallel to the 
DSM-III version, which introduced Narcissistic Personality Disorder into the classification 
manual (DSM-III, American Psychiatric Association, 1980), the NPI originally provided a self-
report measure closely based on criteria presented in DSM-III. However, given that the 
overwhelming majority of empirical research on narcissism has been conducted by social / 
personality psychology rather than by clinicians specializing in personality disorders, the NPI 
has been predominantly used to measure narcissistic traits in nonclinical samples. Cain, Pincus 
and Ansell (2008) conducted a PsychInfo literature search and found that since 1985 the NPI was 
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used as the main or only measure of narcissistic traits in approximately 77% of research studies 
on narcissism (p.643). This impressive body of research documents NPI’s impact on today’s 
conceptualization of narcissism across multiple disciplines including clinical psychology, 
social/personality psychology and psychiatry.  
Research, however, also suggests a number of undesirable consequences resulting from 
equating narcissism to a high NPI score. Most relevant to clinicians specializing in personality 
pathology has been the suggestion that the NPI primarily assesses adaptive characteristics (e.g. 
Watson, Trumpeter, O’Leary, Morris, & Culhane, 2005) thereby rendering the measure 
unsuitable for clinical use.  In support of this claim, a number of studies have found high NPI 
scores to be negatively associated with Neuroticism (Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995) and levels of 
depression (Watson et al., 1992) as well as positively correlated with achievement motivation 
and self-esteem (Lukowitsky, Roberts, Lehner, Pincus, & Conroy 2007). Consequently, some 
investigators have suggested limiting the use of the NPI to the assessment of “subclinical 
narcissism” (Paulhus & Williams, 2002; Wallace & Baumeister, 2002).  Miller and Campbell 
(2008) conducted a study in which they compared the convergent correlates of the NPI and the 
Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ-4; Hyler, 1994) and found that while both measures 
were associated with an antagonistic interpersonal style, the NPI portrayed an emotionally more 
resilient extraverted narcissistic style, whereas the PDQ-4 assessed a more emotionally unstable, 
negative-affect laden form of narcissism. Given the range of NPI’s adaptive associations and the 
absence of studies that specifically compare normal and clinical populations on the NPI (see also 
Cain et al., 2008), a number of recent studies have concluded that the measure predominantly 
assesses the subgroup of non-distressed adaptive expressions of the narcissism construct (Pincus 
& Lukowisky, 2010; Pincus et al., 2009; Cain et al., 2008).  
	   18	  
Studies analyzing the factor structure of the NPI have revealed four dimensions, labeled 
Exploitativeness/Entitlement (E/E), Leadership/Authority (L/A), Superiority/Arrogance (S/A) 
and Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration (S-A/S-A) (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Kubarych, Deary & 
Austin, 2004; Del Rosario & White, 2005). Exploitativeness/Entitlement (EE) is the only 
dimension that is significantly related to suspiciousness, tenseness, anxiety and neuroticism, 
suggesting that this factor most clearly reflects maladaptive aspects of narcissism (Watson, 
Grisham, Trotter, & Biderman, 1984). Similarly, self-esteem is strongly related to the full scale 
and to all factors, except Exploitativeness/Entitlement (E/E), once again supporting the 
hypothesis that this factor is tapping the maladaptive aspects of the trait (Watson, Hickman, 
Morris, Milliron, & Whiting, 1995; Emmons, 1984, 1987). In a study by Watson, Little, Sawrie, 
and Biderman (1992), E/E was associated with lower levels of emotional and cognitive empathy 
and greater self-esteem was a correlate of the three “adaptive” NPI factors but not of E/E.   The 
authors further showed that while superiority covaried directly with all four NPI factors, 
removing the three adaptive NPI factors, made superiority appear less adjusted because the 
connection with greater self-esteem was eliminated and a positive tie with personal distress was 
uncovered (Watson et al., 1992, p. 439). In another study by Exline and colleagues (2004), the 
E/E dimension is inversely related to forgiveness reflecting the narcissist’s difficulties in 
interpersonal functioning (Exline, Baumeister, Bushman, Campbell, & Finkel, 2004). In five 
separate studies conducted in the United Kingdom by Constantine Sedikis and Aiden Gregg 
(2004) of the Center for Research on Self and Identity, the authors established that self-esteem 
fully accounted for the relation between narcissism and psychological health. It should be noted, 
however, these studies concentrated on the correlations between narcissism measures and a 
variety of self-report well-being measures (see also Zuckerman & O'Loughlin, 2009) with the 
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hypothesis that narcissism functions as a distinct personality variable unrelated to attachment or 
object-relatedness. 
This blend of adaptive and maladaptive item content of the NPI has inspired some 
researchers to manipulate NPI total scores in a variety of ways to better distill the healthy and 
unhealthy features inherent in the measure. For example, in a study by Horton, Bleau and 
Drwecki (2006), the authors used multiple regression analysis to partial the variance associated 
with trait self-esteem from narcissism (NPI) scores in order to investigate associations between 
both, ‘healthy narcissism’ and parenting, as well as ‘unhealthy narcissism’ and parenting. 
In sum, narcissism as measured by the NPI has found to be beneficial for psychological 
health insofar as it is related to higher self-esteem (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikis, 2002; Emmons, 
1984, 1987; Morf & Rhodewalt, 1993; Raskin, Novacek & Hogan, 1991). At the same time 
factor analysis showed that E/E is the only dimension of the NPI that lacks this positive relation 
to self-esteem (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Watson et al.,1995).  
For the present study, the literature review above provides the explanation for the 
decision to parse the total NPI score into two narcissism measures. The composite score of the 
three dimensions Leadership/Authority (L/A), Superiority/Arrogance (S/A) and Self-
Absorption/Self-Admiration (S-A/S-A) reflects a participant’s degree of ‘adaptive narcissism’. 
Consequently, the Exploitativeness/Entitlement (E/E) score contributes to the measure on 
‘pathological narcissism’.  
 
Phenotypic heterogeneity within narcissistic pathology: Grandiose versus vulnerable  
Following the addition of narcissistic personality disorder to the third edition of the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-III, American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980) clinicians specializing in personality pathology began to notice that the 
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spectrum of narcissistic disturbances they encountered in their practice was not fully captured by 
the rather narrow DSM criteria (Gabbard, 1989, 1998; Gersten, 1991; Masterson, 1993). These 
clinical observations were soon taken up by personality researchers and contemporary theorists 
on pathological narcissism and engendered multiple empirical studies and clinical accounts 
supporting a two-factor structure indicative of two distinct phenotypes within pathological 
narcissism (Russ, Shedler, Bradley & Westen, 2008; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Cain et al., 2008; 
Fossati, Beauchaine, Grazioli, Carretta, Cortinovis & Maffai, 2005; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003; 
Wink, 1991).  
The first, the grandiose subtype, is well captured by the representation of NPD in the 
DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), which focuses on attributes such as 
grandiosity, arrogance, entitlement, exploitativeness and envy.  The second subtype captures the 
vulnerable narcissistic personality type, which has been depicted as “overtly self-inhibited and 
modest but harboring underlying grandiose expectations for oneself and others” (Dickinson & 
Pincus, 2003, p. 188-189) and as a “shame-ridden, and hypersensitive shy type, whose low 
tolerance for attention from others and hypervigilant readiness for criticism or failure makes 
him/her more socially passive” (Ronningstam, 2009, p.113).   
The literature offers a large variety of dichotomous labels to distinguish between the 
more overtly antagonistic and the more inhibited narcissist, for example, overt versus covert or 
thick-skinned versus thin-skinned (for a comprehensive review see Cain, Pincus, & Ansell, 
2008). For the sake of clarity and consistency, throughout this study, the predominant 
terminology, namely grandiose versus vulnerable, will be used to capture these two narcissistic 
expressions.  
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The grandiose subtype of pathological narcissism  
In its original formulation in DSM-III, NPD still encompassed many of the characteristics 
underlying vulnerable themes, for example, “shameful reactivity or humiliation in response to 
narcissistic injury,” “alternating states of idealization and devaluation,” (DSM-III, American 
Psychiatric Association, 1980). The DSM-IV, however, has relegated these vulnerability 
characteristics to the “Associated Features and Disorders” section (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000), which is rarely consulted by clinicians for formulating a diagnosis. The 
current DSM-IV-TR criteria for NPD focus exclusively on a grandiose sense of self-importance; 
a preoccupation with fantasies of unlimited power, success, brilliance, beauty, or ideal love; a 
belief that he/she is “special” or unique and can only be understood by, and should associate with, 
other special or high-status people or institutions; a need for excessive admiration; a sense of 
entitlement; interpersonal exploitativeness, a lack of empathy; often envious of others or believes 
that others are envious of him/her; and arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes (American 
Psychiatric Association, 2000). Miller and Campbell (2008) undertook a confirmatory factor 
analysis of these NPD criteria and found that they supported a one-factor solution. 
 This restricted focus on grandiosity has become a common criticism in the clinical 
literature (Miller, Widiger, & Campbell, 2010; Gabbard, 2009; Ronningstam, 2009; Cain et al., 
2008; Levy et al., 2007) and has been used as an explanation for the discrepancy of prevalence 
rates between hospital inpatient settings (lower) and private practice (higher) (Lenzenweger, 
2008). The authors of the Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM; PDM Task Force, 2006) 
have tried to counterbalance this development by subdividing narcissistic personality disturbance 
into an Arrogant/Entitled subtype and a Depressed/Depleted subtype.     
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With the aim of verifying that the clinical phenomenon of narcissism may be broader 
than the DSM-IV formulation, Russ and his colleagues asked a substantial random sample of 
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists (N=1,201) to provide detailed psychological descriptions 
of their patients using the Shedler-Westen Assessment Procedure (SWAP-II) (Russ et al., 2008).  
Q-factor analysis identified three subtypes of narcissistic personality disorder which the authors 
labeled grandiose/malignant, fragile and high-functioning /exhibitionistic.  The authors found 
that, “core features of the disorder included interpersonal vulnerability and underlying emotional 
distress, along with anger, difficulty in regulating affect, and interpersonal competitiveness, 
features that are absent from the DSM-IV description of narcissistic personality disorder”          
(p. 1473).   
Personality researchers, Pincus and Lukowitsky (2010) undertook an in-depth analysis of 
NPD’s criterion problem and concluded that, “relying solely on the DSM-IV criteria may impede 
clinical recognition of pathological narcissism” (p.430). Along the same lines, Ronningstam 
(2011) recently tried to convince the DSM-5 Task Force of the need to retain NPD under a set of 
newly formulated diagnostic criteria by arguing that the current manual’s heavy reliance upon 
“grandiosity and external, social, and interpersonal conspicuous behavior” has rendered the 
diagnosis clinically non informative (p.249).  
 
The vulnerable subtype of pathological narcissism  
In response to the one-sided assessment of narcissism reviewed here, Hendin and Cheek 
(1997) developed the Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale (HSNS) by correlating the items of H.A. 
Murray’s (1938) Narcism Scale with an MMPI-based composite measure of covert narcissism. 
Given that the NPI scope is limited to adaptive or maladaptive aspects of narcissistic grandiosity, 
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it is not surprising that the HSNS is uncorrelated with the NPI total score. This lack of 
correlation supports narcissism’s problematic convergent validity and the hypothesis that a so-
called ‘jingle fallacy’ may exist in the measurement of narcissism (Hendin & Cheek, 1997). The 
jingle fallacy occurs when different constructs have been labeled with the same name, leading 
the unsuspecting researcher to believe that all scales which bear the same name are 
interchangeable (Thorndike, 1904, as cited in Block, 1995).  In order to be able to assess both 
grandiose and vulnerable characteristics of narcissism, recent studies (e.g. Miller, Dir, Gentile, 
Wilson, Pryor & Campbell, 2010; Smolewska & Dion, 2005), have used the HSNS in 
conjunction with the NPI.  
 
In sum, until recently the most widely used instruments for assessing narcissism either 
failed to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive functioning (Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory, Raskin & Hall, 1979; Raskin & Terry, 1988), resulting in unstable factor structure 
(Kubarych et al., 2004; Del Rosario & White, 2005) and repeated findings of negative relations 
with psychological distress (Lukowitsky et al., 2007; Sedikides at al., 2004; Trull & McCrae, 
2002; Watson et al., 1992; Emmons, 1984) or focused exclusively on only one of the two 
narcissistic phenotypes (Hypersensitive Narcissism Scale, Hendin & Cheek, 1997).     The lack 
of measures tapping into the comprehensive core pathology of the construct was widely noticed 
and criticized in the field (Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2008; Miller & Campbell, 2008; Watson, 
2005).  
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Assessing the full range of pathological narcissism 
Based on the argument that the NPI measures only a limited scope of pathological 
narcissistic characteristics, by assessing mainly grandiose aspects but neglecting more vulnerable 
narcissistic traits, Pincus and his colleagues recently developed a measure designed to assess a 
wide range of pathological narcissistic traits (Pincus et al., Pathological Narcissism Inventory, 
PNI, 2009). The PNI is a 52-item, multifactorial questionnaire that assesses seven components of 
narcissism: Contingent Self-Esteem (CSE); Exploitativeness (EXP); Self-Sacrificing Self-
Enhancement (SSSE); Hiding the Self (HS); Grandiose Fantasy (GF); Devaluing (DEV) and 
Entitlement Rage (ER). Confirmatory factor analyses of the PNI yielded two higher-order 
components that reflect narcissistic grandiosity (EXP, GF, and SSSE) and narcissistic 
vulnerability (CSE, ER, DEV, and HS) (Tritt et al., 2009; Wright et al., 2008). 
Given the problems associated with the NPI, the PNI was very well received by clinicians 
and researchers specializing in personality pathology. In a recent study, Miller, Dir, Gentile, 
Wilson, Pryor and Campbell (2010) identified a “Vulnerable Dark Triad” comprising the 
following related personality styles: vulnerable narcissism, psychopathy and borderline 
personality disorder. This study is a follow-up on Paulhus and Williams’s (2002) research on the 
co-occurrence between three pathological personality styles that have been titled the “Dark 
Triad”: narcissism, psychopathy and Machiavellianism. Miller and his colleagues (2010) argued 
that the presence of a second triad is necessary, in part, because of the heterogeneity of the 
conceptualization of narcissism. Their results showed that grandiose narcissism, as measured by 
the NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988) differed from the “Vulnerable Dark Triad” personality styles on 
almost every criterion included, such as basic personality, impulsivity, etiological factors and 
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criterion constructs such as psychopathology, affect, attachment, and self-esteem (Miller et al., 
2010).  
Similarly, Tritt et al. (2009) demonstrated that narcissistic vulnerability but not 
narcissistic grandiosity was significantly associated with depression. A finding that is 
particularly interesting as it is contrary to past research showing that narcissism is uncorrelated, 
or inversely related to depression when using the NPI (Sedikis et al, 2004). Notably, Entitlement 
and Exploitativeness (E/E), the NPI’s most pathological subscale, is positively related to 
depression when variance with the three adaptive subscales is removed (Watson & Bidermann, 
1993).  
It follows from the literature reviewed above that current DSM-IV criteria for narcissistic 
personality disorder are too narrowly focused on the grandiose subtype, leaving out other aspects 
of personality and inner experience that are empirically central to the narcissistic disorder. As 
Russ et al. (2008) have pointed out, “a richer and more differentiated view of narcissistic 
personality disorder may help bridge the gap between empirically and clinically derived concepts 
of the disorder” (p. 1473).  The present study aims at contributing to this goal. However, in order 
for researchers and clinicians to benefit from each other’s expertise and in order to advance the 
scientific understanding of personality pathology, they first have to agree on a common 
classification terminology. With regards to narcissistic pathology, these considerations led to 
intense negotiations and entailed multiple compromises on both sides before finding its way into 
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3. Narcissistic personality pathology in the DSM 
 
Traditionally, personality research was subsumed under the field of social psychology 
whereas personality psychopathology was diagnostically crafted by psychiatrists and clinical 
psychologists. Over the last years, the DSM-5 preparation has offered itself as a lively forum 
where both personality traits researchers and clinicians specializing in personality disorders 
present their often markedly diverging views on potential ways of integrating their fields.  
Westen (2006) honed on this debate with his remark, “What is figure to clinicians often is 
ground to trait researchers” (p. 190). In line with this observation, the following serves as a brief 
elaboration and critical review of the main arguments put forward by both camps in defense of 
their diverging positions. 
 
Trait researchers’ perspectives on personality classification 
Advocates of a trait-based classification system are very invested in creating a strong 
empirical basis for personality psychopathology (Krueger, Eaton, Clark, Watson, Markon, 
Derringer, Livesley, 2011; Krueger & Eaton, 2010; Clark, 2005, 2007; Trull & Durret, 2005). In 
a paper by Krueger and Eaton (2010), which was highly influential for the proposed wording of 
the DSM-5 draft1, the authors emphasized how quantitative models of personality trait variation 
have contributed to an “unequivocal conceptual clarity in personality research” (p.97).  Their 
goal is to arrive at a similar utility when applied to psychopathology in a manner that “reflects 
the close links between personality trait variation and risk for psychopathology” (Krueger & 
Eaton, 2010, p.98).   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Krueger	  was	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Personality	  Disorders	  Work	  Group	  and	  co-­‐author	  of	  the	  “Rationale	  for	  a	  trait	  dimensional	  diagnostic	  system”	  as	  published	  online	  by	  the	  DSM-­‐5	  Task	  Force	  (APA,	  2011).	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In addition to the strengthened scientific basis, trait researchers point to potential clinical 
benefits of a nosology change to a dimensional scheme. They argue that formal assessment of a 
patient’s trait profile on multiple dimensions provides a comprehensive understanding of the 
patient’s personality features, whereas a binary diagnosis of a DSM-IV personality disorder 
leaves additional information about the patient’s personality out of the clinical picture (Widiger, 
Costa & Samuel, 2006).  
 In response to the criticism that a dimensional assessment lacks clinical utility (First, 
2010; Gunderson 2010), a formal distinction has been created between the term ‘clinical 
applicability, ’ i.e. effective translation of scientifically valid constructs to clinically applicable 
concepts, and ‘clinical utility’.  The latter term is being discarded by trait researchers, in 
deliberate pejorative language, as “practitioner’s surveys” of model preference, which are denied 
any “weight in constructing a nosology” (Krueger & Eaton, 2010, p. 101).   
  
Clinicians’ perspectives on classification of personality psychopathology 
The lively debate triggered by the DSM-5 preparation, exemplifies the complications of 
devising a classification scheme that adequately reflects the priorities of both the clinical and the 
research communities.  At the core of this dispute lies the fact that clinicians and researchers are 
not necessarily guided by the same principles in their daily work. A clinician’s priority is to gain 
a comprehensive clinical picture of the unique individual presenting as a patient, whereas 
researchers seek to hone in on the universal characteristics of a certain variable independent of 
its context.  
Historically, a clinician’s training and degree conveyed large discretional power in 
diagnosing patients (the American classification system is barely 50 years old). However, 
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today’s zeitgeist favors scientific scrutiny, which can be better upheld by subjecting isolated 
variables to empirical testing methods. By contrast, clinical salience is much more difficult to 
define in scientific terms. Gunderson (2010), referred to the existing personality disorders as, 
“rich clinical traditions that offer meaningful ways to understand patients and useful wisdom 
regarding the ways to treat or not to treat them effectively” (p. 120). Gunderson’s (2010) critique 
is not an attempt to defend the construct validity of the exiting ten personality disorders (he 
largely agrees with their low factor structure). Instead, he makes the argument that today’s 
diagnosis of a specific personality disorder conveys valuable clinical wisdom that has been 
developed by the clinical community over many years.  Such wisdom, he pointed out, “is not 
conveyed by trait domains called ‘peculiar’ or ‘antagonistic,’ the clinical implications of which 
need to be developed from scratch” (Gunderson, 2010, p.120).  Wakefield (2008) raised similar 
concerns with respect to the static nature of traits, “it is the way the traits interact and what the 
interaction yields, not anything in the trait profile itself, that constitutes the disorder (p.382).  To 
this, Skodol and Bender (2009) add a frank picture of clinical reality: “Dimensional models are 
unfamiliar to clinicians trained in the medical model of diagnosis, in which a single diagnostic 
concept is used to communicate a large amount of clinical information about a patient’s 
problems, indicated treatment, and likely prognosis” (p.388).   
While these authors grant the dimensional model its claim to greater scientific scrutiny, 
they bestow a meaning onto clinical diagnosis (or clinical naming) that transcends the 
classification intentions of the authors of the DSM.  In other words, for an experienced clinician, 
a patient diagnosed with a certain personality disorder conveys more clinically useful 
information than the sum of the particular diagnostic criteria. This is a strong argument in favor 
of preserving valuable clinical understanding built by multiple generations of clinicians.  
	   29	  
Implicitly, however, this view conveys a large discretional power to practitioners and their 
‘traditional’ understanding of psychopathology without subjecting it to empirical evidence.  
Notes from an early APA Research Planning Work Group for DSM-V reveal exactly this 
dilemma. On the one hand, there is an explicit wish for integration of scientific study, but on the 
other hand, the committee openly expressed doubts about the clinical approval of these changes: 
“If a dimensional system of personality performs well and is acceptable to clinicians, it might 
then be appropriate to explore dimensional approaches in other domains” [my emphasis] 
(Rounsaville at al., 2002, p.13).  
During the process of revising the DSM-IV-TR, the personality disorders work group 
proposed a number of alternative models as a replacement of the entirely categorical system. To 
maintain the spirit of more stringent scientific accountability, the work group developed 
empirically based criteria for each personality disorder that would allow clinicians to perform 
dimensional ratings. This framework allows for patients to be evaluated by criteria based on (i) 
typical impairments in personality functioning (e.g. identity, self-direction, empathy and 
intimacy) and (ii) pathological personality traits in one or more trait domains. 
The gestalt of this development gets expressed by a compromise referred to as the 
“hybrid dimensional-categorical model for personality and personality assessment and diagnosis” 
by the DSM-5 Task Force (APA, 2012). According to Skodol and Bender (2009) this approach 
“attempts to capitalize on the strengths of several dimensional models that have been offered as 
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During most of the preparatory phase of the DSM-5, it was unclear whether NPD would 
make the cut to be retained as a specific personality disorder type. NPD (in its current DSM-IV 
formulation) was regarded as a particularly weak diagnosis with regards to the following two 
criteria: (i) clinical utility of the syndrome (e.g. its frequency of use, its importance for making 
treatment decisions, the degree of attention to the diagnosis in professional groups) and (ii) 
construct validity of the category (the degree to which inferences can legitimately be made from 
the operationalization in empirical research to the theoretical construct) (Kendler et al., 2009). 
 However, the proposed deletion of NPD during the DSM-5 field testing triggered a flood 
of responses and critiques by highly distinguished clinicians and researchers in the published 
literature (most notably, Ronningstam, 2011; Pincus, 2011; Gunderson, 2010; First, 2010) and 
led to the eventual re-inclusion of NPD as a specific personality disorder type (APA, 2011). 
These authors make the argument that the deletion of NPD is hardly the right response to 
narcissism’s fundamental criterion problem. Instead, they strongly favor the replacement of the 
overly narrow definition of DSM-IV narcissism by a well-defined diagnostic base in the DSM by 
placing the focus on enduring indications of pathological narcissism rather than on phenotypic 
appearance.  
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For a diagnosis of NPD based on the “Alternative DSM-5 model for personality 
disorders,” the following criteria must be met (DSM-5, Section III, 2013): 
 
A. Significant impairments in personality functioning manifested by: 
 
1. Impairments in self functioning (a or b): 
 
a. Identity: Excessive reference to others for self-definition and self-esteem 
regulation; exaggerated self-appraisal may be inflated or deflated, or 
vacillate between extremes; emotional regulation mirrors 
fluctuations in self-esteem. 
b. Self-direction: Goal-setting is based on gaining approval from others; personal 
standards are unreasonably high in order to see oneself as 
exceptional, or too low based on a sense of entitlement; often 
unaware of own motivations. 
  AND 
 
2. Impairments in interpersonal functioning (a or b): 
 
a. Empathy:  Impaired ability to recognize or identify with the feelings and needs of 
others; excessively attuned to reactions of others, but only if perceived as 
relevant to self; over- or underestimate of own effect on others. 
b. Intimacy:  Relationships largely superficial and exist to serve self-esteem regulation; 
mutuality constrained by little genuine interest in others’ experiences and 
predominance of a need for personal gain. 
 
B. Pathological personality traits in the following domain: 
 
Antagonism, characterized by: 
 
a. Grandiosity:  Feelings of entitlement, either overt or covert; self-centeredness; 
firmly holding to the belief that one is better than others; 
condescending toward others. 
b. Attention seeking: Excessive attempts to attract and be the focus of the attention of 
others; admiration seeking. 
 
C.  The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait 
expression are relatively stable across time and consistent across situations. 
D. The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait 
expression are not better understood as normative for the individual’s developmental 
stage or socio-cultural environment. 
E. The impairments in personality functioning and the individual’s personality trait 
expression are not solely due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a 
drug of abuse, medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., severe head trauma). 
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This alternative DSM-5 NPD type offers thus a first step for enhanced construct validity 
by providing a more clinically nuanced conceptualization of pathological narcissism. However, 
extensive empirical research is needed to establish whether the revised approach to NPD can 
offer a well-defined diagnostic base for promoting integrative scientific advances in 
understanding and treatment of narcissism. The current study aims at contributing to this effort 
by examining how correlational findings of the relationship between narcissistic functioning and 
attachment as well as RF can enhance the clinical utility of an NPD diagnosis.  
 
4. Adult attachment and narcissism 
Attachment theory has long offered a persuasive theoretical paradigm for understanding 
personality psychopathology. Interest in adult attachment research has flourished in recent years 
(Ainsworth, 1989; Slade, 1999; Collins & Read, 1990; Carnelly, Pietromonaco, & Jaffe, 1994; 
Hazan & Shaver, 1990; Main, 1990).  However, given attachment theory’s relevance for the 
study of personality structure and organization (Bowlby, 1980; Sroufre & Waters, 1977), early 
adult attachment research was mainly concerned with normal personality functioning 
(Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Duggan & Brennan, 1994; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).  
There has also been a considerable emphasis on research related to intergenerational 
transmission of attachment styles (Bretherton, 1991; Fonagy, Steele & Steele, 1991; Main & 
Hesse, 1990).   
While general personality disorder research has found associations with insecure styles of 
attachment (Bender, Farber, & Geller, 2001; West, Keller, Links & Patrick, 1993; West and 
Sheldon-Keller, 1994), it is only recently, that psychopathology researchers have begun to apply 
attachment related constructs to specific personality pathology types, albeit mainly for borderline 
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personality disorder (Levy et al., 2006; Blatt & Levy, 2003; Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist & Target, 
2002; Diamond, Yeomans, Clarkin, Levy, Kernberg, 2008). Thus far, very little has been written 
about the ways in which attachment research may be integrated with empirical studies on 
narcissistic personality pathology.  
Attachment theory and research 
Attachment theory postulates a universal human need to form close relationships. 
According to John Bowlby, the founder of attachment theory, the human infant is born with a 
biologically programmed system aimed at forming close emotional bonds with significant others 
(Bowlby, 1980). From an evolutionary perspective, the attachment system primarily ensures 
physical protection of the vulnerable human infant. According to attachment theory, this original 
function has been subsumed under a far more complex role of the attachment relationship, 
namely to serve as the first and foremost regulator of emotional experience (Sroufe, 1996; 
Ainsworth, 1989).  Since humans lack the inborn capacity to regulate their own emotional 
reactions, the infant learns to seek the caregiver’s help in a moment of emotional arousal in order 
to reestablish equilibrium.  Over time these experiences with the caregiver are aggregated into 
representational systems that Bowlby (1969, 1973) termed the internal working model.  
Fonagy and Bateman (2008) elaborated on this model by eliciting four mental 
representational systems implicated in attachment: 
1) expectations of interactive attributes of early caregivers created  in the first year of life and 
subsequently elaborated ;  
2) event representations by which general and specific memories of attachment-related 
experiences are encoded and retrieved;  
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3) autobiographical memories by which specific events are conceptually connected because of 
their relationship to a continuing personal narrative and developing self-understanding; and  
4) understanding of the psychological characteristics of other people and differentiating them 
from the characteristics of the self. (p. 211)  
Thus, individuals approach the interpersonal world with a complex set of assumptions that have 
been largely shaped by early caregiving experiences and are then generalized to adult 
relationships later in life.   
 
Research on personality disorders and attachment 
A number of theories have drawn on Bowlby’s ideas to account for personality 
psychopathology. Of all the ten personality disorders categorically classified in the DSM-IV, the 
single most widely researched diagnosis is borderline personality disorder (BPD). It is therefore 
not surprising that the bulk of empirical studies on personality dysfunction and attachment 
revolves around the BPD construct.  Clinical researchers have repeatedly found that fundamental 
aspects of BPD, such as unstable and intense interpersonal relationships, feelings of emptiness, 
bursts of rage, chronic fears of abandonment, and a lack of a stable sense of self, are stemming 
from impairments in the underlying attachment organization (Levy, Beeney & Temes, 2010; 
Diamond et al., 2008; Blatt & Levy, 2003; Fonagy et al., 2002).  
Gunderson (1996), for example suggested that intolerance of aloneness was at the core of 
borderline pathology and that the inability to invoke a “soothing introject” was due to early 
attachment failures of BPD patients. Another study assessed internal representations of 
attachment (via the Adult Attachment Interview) and found that individuals classified as BPD 
evinced the mental organization characteristic of preoccupied attachment (Patrick, Hobson, 
Castle, Howard, & Maughan, 1994).  
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Further research on other specific personality disorder types has found evidence for 
discriminating dependent and schizoid personality disorders on the basis of an enmeshed 
(“preoccupied”) versus a detached (”dismissing”) interpersonal style (West & Sheldon-Keller, 
1994).  Based on a sample of patients with avoidant personality disorder, Sheldon and West 
(1990) reported that heightened desire for and fear of attachment relationships were more 
diagnostic of avoidant personality disorder than were poor social skills.  
 
The only study that used a sample large enough to empirically examine structural 
connections between adult attachment styles and 13 distinct personality disorders was conducted 
by Brennan and Shaver (1998). A nonclinical group of 1407 individuals, mostly adolescents and 
young adults, were surveyed about their attachment styles, parental marital status, parental 
mortality status, perceptions of treatment by parents in childhood, and 13 personality disorders. 
Results indicated substantial overlap between attachment and personality disorder measures. One 
of the substantial limitations of this study is the use of the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire 
(PDQ-R, Hyler & Rieder, 1987) as the measure to assess for an exiting personality disorder. This 
measure is known to suffer from an over-inclusion bias, as demonstrated in this study by the fact 
that 75% of all subjects had at least one personality disorder. Even though their results may not 
generalize well to clinical populations, the findings still suggest that patterns of insecure 
attachment significantly overlap with patterns of disordered personality organization. The 
finding that both personality disorders and attachment styles were associated with family of 
origin-variables further indicate that the “quality of one’s early attachment to caregivers accounts 
for some of the variance in abnormal or maladaptive personality functioning” (Brennan & 
Shaver, 1998, p.868).  
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Measuring adult attachment 
Mary Ainsworth and her colleagues have demonstrated in numerous studies that an 
intrinsic part of a child’s early emotional development is the creation of an individualized 
attachment relationship expressed through one of originally three alternative strategies, labeled 
as Secure attachment, Avoidant attachment or Anxious Ambivalent attachment. Because in a 
significant number of families children could not be categorized, a fourth classification, labeled 
Disorganized attachment, has been created (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978).   
Ainsworth’s observational technique for the study of infant–parent relationships was 
subsequently extended through two major lines of research on adult attachment. One route, 
followed mostly by developmental and clinical psychologists, was based on coded narrative 
assessments, notably the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George, Kaplan, & Main, 1985), a 
clinical interview focused on mental representations of parent–child relationships. The second 
line of research was generated mainly by social psychologists (Hazan & Shaver, 1987) who 
applied Bowlby’s and Ainsworth’s ideas to the study of attachment-related thoughts and feelings 
in adult relationships and developed self-report measures suitable for use in experiments and 
surveys (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).  While both major lines of research on adult attachment 
provided evidence for construct validity (for a review see Bartholomew & Shaver, 1998), there 
has been relatively little communication and cross-fertilization (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). 
This study will use a self-report measure of a four-category model of adult attachment 
developed by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991).  Based on Bowlby’s formulations, 
Bartholomew and colleagues proposed a fourfold typology of attachment (Griffin & 
Bartholomew, 1994). Bowlby systematized the internal working model by defining individual 
differences in attachment in terms of the intersections of two dimensions, ranging from a positive 
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to negative model of the self and a positive to negative model of others (1980). These internal 
working models are established in infancy and provide prototypes for later relationships. Since 
they function outside of awareness, they are largely change resistant (Crittenden, 1990). Thus, 
conceptually, individuals who are securely attached possess largely positive models of self and 
others (labeled as ‘secure’). Those individuals who possess a positive model of others coupled 
with a negative model of themselves, are termed ‘preoccupied’. In contrast, ‘dismissing’ 
individuals possess a positive model of themselves, but a negative model of others. The fourth 
category concerns ‘fearful’ individuals who hold both, negative models of themselves as well as 
of others.  
Although the stability of attachment has been demonstrated by longitudinal studies of 
infants who were assessed with the Strange Situation and followed up in young adulthood with 
the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), it would be too simplistic to claim that personality 
disorders originate in parent-infant attachment. Rather than follow a developmentally 
reductionist model, this study aims to examine the contribution of attachment to the complex and 
heterogeneous construct of narcissism in order to further enhance the clinical discrimination 
between narcissistic traits within the normative realm and pathological narcissistic expressions. 
 
Research on narcissism’s underlying attachment organization 
Functionally, attachment and narcissism can both be conceptualized as systems involved 
in regulating emotional experience. Further shared theoretical components involve cognitive-
affective patterns and the joint accommodation of healthy as well as pathological development 
and functioning (Kernberg, 1998; Kohut, 1977; West & Sheldon-Keller, 1994; Pincus, 
Lukowitsky, & Wright, 2010). Attachment, however, is more firmly rooted in a developmental 
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deficit model, stressing the caregiver’s role in reestablishing emotional equilibrium. Thus, the 
emphasis of attachment theory is on the interpersonal dyad and its representation, as the 
caregiver is conceptually portrayed as experienced as separate from the self (Silverman, 1991). 
In contrast, leading theoretical conceptions of narcissism hone in on undifferentiated or merged 
aspects of the self, or, as referred to in structural theory, the pathological ego organization 
(Kernberg, 1998).  
As outlined in more detail above, the clinical construct of narcissism has been weakened 
by heterogeneity and low clinical utility leading up to its contested and rather precarious re-
installment into the new diagnostic manual. Although relations between narcissistic 
phenomenology and adult attachment styles have been proposed in both theoretical and clinical 
accounts, there exists little empirical research to confirm this link.  It is therefore highly relevant 
to gather empirical evidence on the level of impairment in personality functioning (self and 
interpersonal) of individuals exhibiting pathological trait narcissism.   
Few studies have empirically examined the relationship between attachment and 
narcissism. Only one study, conducted by Brennan and Shaver (1998), compared all classified 
personality disorder types to categorical attachment styles. The authors used a fairly large 
number of participants (N= 1407), mostly adolescents and young adults, to explore connections 
between attachment styles and personality disorders in order to determine whether the two kinds 
of variables share a common underlying structure.  Across all 13 personality disorders, their 
results indicated a substantial overlap between attachment style and personality-disorder 
measures. Securely attached individuals were nearly twice as likely not to have a personality 
disorder as to have one (75.0% versus 38.8%). A closer look at the narcissistic personality 
disorder subtype, however, reveals only marginally discriminating power for attachment style: 
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30.4% Secure, 34.3% Fearful, 19.6% Preoccupied and 15.7% Dismissing.  These results 
exemplify narcissism’s inherent criterion problem, stemming from its over-inclusion of both 
adaptive and pathological elements as well as its phenomenological diversity (grandiose versus 
vulnerable).   
 Aware of the low discriminatory power between adaptive and maladaptive components 
of narcissism as measured by the Narcissistic Personality Index (NPI; Raskin & Terry, 1988), 
Dickinson and Pincus (2003) parsed the measure into its two components, grandiose and 
vulnerable, and found that vulnerable narcissism was associated with high ratings on Fearful 
attachment (50%) and avoidant personality disorder. However, they also found that the majority 
of the grandiose group selected a Secure (60%) attachment style and only a minority was 
associated with Dismissive attachment (16%).  
In a related study, Smolenska and Dion (2005) conducted a canonical correlation analysis 
in order to explore the multivariate relationship between overt and covert narcissism on one hand 
and adult attachment dimensions of anxiety and avoidance, on the other hand. Consistent with 
the findings by Dickinson and Pincus (2003), their analysis indicated that, by far, the highest 
canonical loading existed between covert (vulnerable) narcissism and anxiety attachment. It is 
noteworthy that the bivariate correlation coefficients between grandiose narcissism and anxious 
or avoidant attachment was insignificant (r=.124, and r=-.037, respectively).  
One way of interpreting the results found in both studies, is that grandiose individuals’ 
denial of interpersonal distress makes sense given their tendency to habitually dismiss personal 
and interpersonal difficulties (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971). In fact, this lack of interest and 
insight into the impact these individuals have upon others, is what prompted Gabbard (1989) to 
coin the label “oblivious narcissists.” At the same time, prominent theories of grandiose 
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narcissism suggest that, clinically, the disorder presents at different levels of severity. The 
mildest cases present with symptoms that maybe treated without an effort to modify or resolve 
their narcissistic personality structure, whereas, at the other end of the spectrum, the syndrome of 
malignant narcissism includes, in addition to narcissistic personality disorder, severe antisocial 
behavior, significant paranoid trends, and self- or other-directed aggression (Kernberg, 2009). 
This suggests that individuals who report low interpersonal distress and are associated with a 
positive self-representation and high overall functioning might be experienced as oblivious and 
arrogant by others, but are to be clinically clearly distinguished from the aggressive antisocial 
behavior of patients with the syndrome of malignant narcissism. Confounding common social 
conceptions of the entitled ubiquitous narcissist among us, with a serious and debilitating 
personality pathology is highly problematic as it further dilutes narcissism’s construct validity.  
During the DSM-5 drafting sessions, popular science journalism has already promulgated a 
picture of narcissism that is more akin to Woody Allen’s satirical spin on the classic neurotic 
character rather than being descriptive of serious personality pathology2. Given the detrimental 
behaviors associated with pathological narcissism, more research (beyond clinical case 
descriptions) is needed to reflect a greater balance of theory and empirical evidence. In light of 
today’s scientifically minded zeitgeist, this is also the only route to ensure the diagnosis’ 
continuous inclusion in future DSMs.  
The current study aims at contributing to this need by conducting an empirical 
investigation that takes into account narcissism’s significant criterion problem, including the 
boundaries between normal and pathological narcissism and its two pathological subtypes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Examples	  of	  popular	  psychology	  journalism:	  “A	  Fate	  that	  Narcissists	  Will	  Hate:	  Being	  Ignored,“	  read	  the	  New	  York	  Times	  headline	  on	  November	  9,	  2010.	  “For	  decades	  a	  cure	  for	  narcissism	  has	  been	  elusive.	  Now	  we	  have	  one:	  simply	  take	  the	  diagnosis	  out	  of	  DSM-­‐5,”	  said	  a	  “Psychology	  Today”	  blogger	  on	  March	  30,	  2011.	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narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability.  Instead of using traditional measures, 
predominantly the NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988), which, as outlined in more detail above, has 
been shown to reflect a confusing mix of adaptive and maladaptive content, this study will apply 
a blend of subscales of narcissism measures that represent all three phenomenological diverse 
subtypes (adaptive, grandiose, vulnerable) to the extent that they have shown to possess robust 
internal consistency (Rose & White, 2005).   
In sum, attachment difficulties have been widely associated with greater psychiatric 
disturbances patients with personality disorders (Bender, Farber & Geller, 1997; West, Keller, 
Links & Patrick, 1993; West & Sheldon-Keller, 1994). Furthermore, the new approach to the 
assessment of narcissistic personality disorder in the DSM-5 proposal shifts the focus to the 
evaluation of the patient’s core impairments in interpersonal and self functioning. Therefore, 
establishing the attachment correlates of different subtypes of narcissism may contribute to our 
theoretical understanding of this disorder as well as enlarge its clinical utility. 
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5. Reflective Functioning and Narcissism 
During the past decade, mentalization has matured into a central theoretical concept for 
the study of personality development and pathology. Its corresponding research concept, referred 
to as Reflective Functioning (RF), has been employed for measuring the quality of mentalizing 
capacity in the context of specific attachment narratives. Existing literature on RF and 
personality psychopathology is mainly concerned with the implications for borderline personality 
disorder (BPD) diagnosis and treatment (Fonagy, Luyten & Strathearn, 2011; Fischer-Kern, 
Buchheim, Doering, Schuster, Taubner, Kapusta & Fonagy, 2010; Fonagy & Luyten, 2009; 
Fonagy & Bateman, 2007; Gunderson & Choi-Kahn, 2008). Although narcissistic pathology 
shares some conceptual ground with BPD, specific empirical data on RF and narcissistic 
personality expressions may prove essential in broadening our understanding of the disorder. 
Theoretical considerations and empirical findings 
The term mentalization has been coined by Fonagy and colleagues to describe the way in 
which individuals make sense of their own and others’ actions as meaningful on the basis of 
intentional mental states such as beliefs, needs, feelings and motives (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004; 
Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Fonagy & Target, 1997). Expressed as a model of 
social cognition, mentalization theory integrates developmental research in attachment, theory of 
mind and psychoanalytic concepts. It builds on the assumption that in order to generate a 
representational system for internal emotional states, the infant must first internalize the 
representation of the caregiver’s reflection of her or his experience (Gergely & Watson, 1996). 
However, mirroring alone, defined as contingency in time, space and emotional tone, is not 
enough. The mirroring has to be marked, or exaggerated, in order for the infant to understand the 
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caregiver’s display as part of his experience rather than an expression of the adult (Fonagy et al., 
2002; Gergely, 2002). This model states that the caregiver’s marked and contingent mirroring 
helps the child convert sensory experience into contained awareness, or in other words, 
facilitates the child’s capacity to mentalize. There is evidence to suggest that the absence of 
marked contingent mirroring of the infant’s internal states is associated with later impairments of 
self-regulation and disorganized attachment (Fonagy et al., 2002; Gergely, & Koós, 2001; 
Gergely, Koos, & Watson, 2002).  
The link between attachment and mentalization was investigated by a number of studies. 
The majority of the research showed that the quality of a child’s primary attachment relationship 
was predictive of his or her mentalization capacity  (Raikes & Thompson, 2006; Steele, Steele, 
Croft & Fonagy, 1999; Fonagy & Target, 1997). It should be noted, however, that not all studies 
find this relationship and that it is more likely to be observed for emotion understanding than 
theory of mind (Fonagy & Bateman, 2007).  It is hoped that the current study will contribute to a 
better understanding of the conceptual overlap between attachment and mentalization for 
narcissistic personalities.  
 
The link between mentalization and personality pathology 
There exists an extensive literature demonstrating that personality pathology is associated 
with characteristic patterns of thinking about self and self-in-relation-to-others (Blatt, Stayner, 
Auerbach, & Behrends, 1996; Kernberg, 1984; Fonagy, 1991; Blatt, 2008; Kernberg & Caligor, 
2005; Levy, Meehan, Kelly, Reynoso, Weber, Clarkin & Kernberg, 2006). Working from an 
object relations perspective, Kernberg formulated a classification of character pathology that 
encompasses personality types arrayed along a severity continuum (1970/1989). Central to 
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Kernberg’s personality organization system is the quality of an individual’s mental 
representation of self and others (1989). Other authors have portrayed individuals suffering from 
personality disorder as “possessing problematic self-states, inadequate self-representations, 
restricted self-narratives, and poor self-reflection and self-regulatory strategies” (Dimaggio, 
Semerari, Carcione, Procacci, & Nicolo, 2006, p.610). Coming from a personality traits 
perspective, Livesley and Jang (2000) have conceptualized personality problems as emanating 
from three self-other realms: (1) the adaptive self-system, which allows for forming and 
maintaining integrated representations of self and others; (2) the capacity to form intimate 
relationships; (3) the ability to function effectively in society. Applying a social-cognitive line of 
thinking, Anderson and Cole (1990), found that individuals tend to create social categories based 
on their preexisting mental modes of significant others.  
The notion that maladaptive patterns of mentally representing self and others serve as the 
substrates for personality pathology are common to a wide range of conceptualizations, such as 
psychodynamic, interpersonal, social-cognitive and trait also found its way into the DSM-5 
proposal (Skodol & Bender, 2009).  By defining personality psychopathology as “emanating 
from disturbances in thinking about self and others,” the proponents of the DSM-5, Section III 
(2013) validate rich theories on personality and psychopathology that have not been duly 
reflected in the phenomenological description of the DSM-IV personality disorders. Additionally, 
by including self and interpersonal impairments as core criteria for personality pathology, the 
revised diagnostic manual makes room for a more effective integration of clinical diagnosis and 
empirically supported theories. In particular, the new wording entails the recognition of the 
prominent roles of reflective functioning and self- and emotion regulation mechanisms in 
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contemporary psychodynamic theories (Fonagy, 1991; Fonagy & Bateman, 1997; Blatt, 2008; 
Kernberg & Caligor, 2005; Levy et al., 2006). 
Related borderline personality disorder research  
Over the past decade, clinical research interest in borderline personality disorder and 
mentalization impairments developed largely in tandem, leading to conceptually and empirically 
interrelated constructs. It is therefore not surprising that the majority of studies on RF and 
personality pathology concentrate on the BPD population. According to Kernberg’s structural 
theory of borderline personality organization (1975), both, narcissistic and borderline personality 
constructs can be conceptualized in terms of poorly integrated representations of self and others 
as well as undifferentiated affect. Diagnostically, this translates into high rates of overlap 
between NPD and other Axis II disorders, especially within the dramatic cluster of histrionic, 
antisocial and borderline (cluster B personality disorders; Ronningstam, 2005; Gunderson, 
Ronningstam. & Smith, 1991). 
A comparison between BPD and NPD diagnoses in a sample of treatment refractory 
patients, showed that patients with NPD present with more selected Axis II disorders and traits, 
specifically antisocial, histrionic, and passive-aggressive traits, but lower levels of anxiety and 
depression as well as fewer mood and anxiety disorders. In fact, the authors found that the more 
narcissistic traits present, the more Axis II disorders are present, but the fewer Axis I disorders 
are present (Clemence, Perry, & Plakun, 2009). 
At the same time, there also exist some clear phenomenological distinctions between 
narcissistic and borderline presentations, such as the narcissist’s higher social relatedness and 
greater overall functioning (Kernberg, 1975; Gunderson & Ronningstam, 2001). While findings 
on BPD and mentalization can therefore provide informative data for the current study, several 
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authors also caution that overly inclusive clusters of personality impairments hinder effective 
empirical research and result in muddled treatment implications (Pincus & Lukowitsky, 2010; 
Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2007).  
Nevertheless, when it comes to distortions in thinking about self and others, BPD 
research provides valuable information on central impairments of this personality malfunctioning. 
Notably, several studies have found that while borderline patients’ representations of self and 
others are often more elaborated and complicated compared to those of other patients, they also 
include more distorted and openly hostile content (Westen, Ludolph, Lerner, Ruffins, & Wiss, 
1990). Similarly, facial expression studies have shown that BPD patients are significantly more 
likely to assign negative attributions and emotions to the picture of a face with a neutral 
expression (Wagner & Linehan, 1999).  
Such difficulty integrating representations of themselves and others are also reflected in 
treatment settings. BPD patients struggle significantly more than patients with Axis I disorders to 
create a helpful mental image of the treatment provider and the therapeutic relationship (Bender, 
Farber & Geller, 1997; Zeeck, Hartmann, & Orlinsky, 2006). Likewise, if the treatment focuses 
on this difficulty by employing interpretation as the route to integration of these disparate 
perceptions and representations, as is the case in transference-focused psychotherapy (TFP), 
significant increases in RF were found as a function of treatment (Levy, Mehan, Keller, Reynoso, 
Weber, Clarkin & Kernberg, 2006).  
Fonagy and Bateman (2007) elaborated on the concept of mentalization by proposing a 
complex relationship between early attachment, trauma and borderline personality disorder that 
incorporates three mechanisms by which mentalization becomes destabilized or impaired in BPD 
patients: first as a deficit, second as a defense and thirdly as a derailment due to dysregulated 
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affect (Fonagy & Bateman, 2007; Choi-Kahn & Gunderson, 2008). More recently, following the 
incorporation of neurobiological research, Fonagy and colleagues (2011, 2009) derived at a more 
complex theoretical paradigm that supports a developmental, bio-behavioral switch-model of the 
relationship between mentalization, stress and attachment. In addition to a highly sensitive 
activation of the attachment system, BPD is conceptualized as the phenomenological result of a 
low threshold for the deactivation of controlled mentalization, coupled with impairments in the 
ability to differentiate mental states of self and other (Fonagy, Luyten & Strathearn, 2011; 
Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
A recent empirical study, aimed at examining the relationship and theoretical common 
ground of the concepts of personality organization (Kernberg, 1984, 1996) and that of 
mentalization (Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002; Fonagy & Target, 1996), found 
moderate associations between RF and the level of personality organization in a sample (N= 92) 
of female BPD patients (Fischer-Kern, Buchheim, Doering, Schuster, Taubner, Kapusta & 
Fonagy, 2010). In contrast, impairment in mentalizing capacity did not correspond to the severity 
of Axis I and Axis II pathology, a finding that the authors attributed to the “homogeneity” of the 
study sample” (Fischer-Kern at al., 2010, p. 406). In a previous study conducted by Bouchard 
and colleagues (2008), the investigators were able to show lower levels of mentalization to be 
significantly associated with the severity of both Axis I and Axis II pathology in a heterogeneous 
clinical and nonclinical sample (Bouchard, Lecours, Tremblay, Target, Fonagy, Schachter & 
Stein, 2008).   
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Narcissism and reflective functioning  
In his extensive work on biopsychological origins of affect regulation, Schore (1994) 
suggested that patients with NPD lack “access to symbolic representation that can perform the 
important self-soothing, reparative functions encoded in evocative memory. They can not 
execute a reciprocal mode of autonomic control,” and “their ability to autoregulate affect are 
fundamentally impaired” (p. 429).  Building their theory of mentalization on that proposed 
interface between genetics and environment, Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist and Target (2002) 
suggested that, “it is the manner in which the environment is experienced that acts as a filter in 
the expression of genotype into phenotype” (p.7). With regard to the etiology of narcissistic 
personality pathology, Fonagy et al. assume the following specific mirroring structure as 
predisposing a child to NPD: 
When affect mirroring is appropriately marked but noncontingent, in that the infant’s emotion is 
misperceived by the caregiver, the baby will still feel the mirrored affect display to map onto his 
primary emotion state. However, as this mirrored state is incongruent with the infant’s actual 
feelings, the secondary representation created will be distorted. The infant will mislabel the 
primary, constitutional emotional state. The self-representation will not have string ties to the 
underlying emotional state. The individual may convey an impression of reality, but as the 
constitutional state has not been recognized by the caregiver, the self will feel empty because it 
reflects the activation of secondary representations of affects that lack the corresponding 
connections within the constitutional self.  
(Fonagy et al., 2002, pp.10-11)    
Growing out of these theoretical accounts are assumptions about the behavioral 
manifestations of these impairments, most notably, the need for individuals whose capacity for 
mentalization is not well-developed to use “controlling and manipulative strategies to restore 
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coherence to their sense of self” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004, p.90). In this sense, the defensive 
inhibition of mentalization becomes apparent in the phenomenological presentation of the 
grandiose narcissist.  There is, however, a paucity of empirical research to support these 
theoretical paradigms.  
A recent study conducted by Fan et al. (2011) investigated the somewhat related concepts 
of decreased affective resonance (referred to as “empathy”) in subjects with high and low 
narcissistic traits. Psychological and neuroimaging data indicate higher degrees of alexithymia 
and lower deactivation during empathy in the insula in high narcissistic subjects (Fan, 
Wonneberger, Enzi, de Greek, Ulrich, Tempelmann, Bogerts, Doering, & Northoff, 2011). 
However, while empathy and mentalization share some conceptual ground, the two constructs 
overlap only partially. Both involve appreciation of mental states in others, yet empathy is 
primarily affectively focused and more other-oriented while mentalization is also a cognitive 
skill that is equally self and other oriented (Choi-Kain & Gunderson, 2008). The exploratory 
study by Fan et al. (2011) is thus informative as it confirms theoretical assumptions on narcissists’ 
decreased affective resonance, but it does not allow us to draw specific conclusions about 
narcissism’s relation to RF.  
Diamaggio et al. (2008) explored the subjective experience of narcissistic patients 
through the analysis of psychotherapy session transcripts and found that the patients’ dominant 
states of mind were characterized by distrust towards others and feelings of being harmed or 
excluded (Dimaggio, Nicolo, Fiore, Centenero, Semerari, & Pedone, 2008).  The data seems to 
support the assumption that a deactivation or suppression of the mentalizing process takes place 
during negative states of mind. The authors note that in particular, “unpleasant arousal may thus 
lead to anger, with the narcissistic person perceiving that the other has caused their suffering, in 
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turn biasing their perception that the latter is hostile and rejecting” (p. 477). For this reason, the 
quality of RF might serve as a valuable indicator for a better distinction between adaptive and 
non-adaptive narcissistic expressions. 
In a recent publication by Bender, Morey and Skodol (2011) on various models for 
assessing levels of personality functioning in the revised DSM, the authors stressed that the 
ability to mentalize formed a crucial part in that exercise. They note, “specifically, impairments 
in mentalizing function make it difficult to create, maintain and use stable internal 
representations of self and other” (p.338). Furthermore, problems with the ability to mentalize 
have been identified as especially relevant to narcissistic and borderline difficulties, considering 
the association of these pathologies with difficulties in integrating multiple perspectives from 
self and other (Bender, 2012).  In light of these considerations, the current study aims at 
providing further empirical knowledge about the interplay of three narcissistic expressions 
(grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) and the capacity for reflective functioning.  
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6. Summary, Aims and Hypotheses 
This study explores the relations of adaptive as well as pathological (grandiose and 
vulnerable) expressions of narcissism to attachment style and the capacity for mentalization (RF). 
Theoretical accounts support the notion that maladaptive patterns of mentally representing self 
and others serve as the substrates for narcissism. Specifically, insecure attachment status and 
poor integration of cognitive and affective aspects of mentalization are linked to pathological 
expressions of narcissism. However, very little empirical work has been done to investigate 
whether different phenotypic expressions of narcissism (adaptive, grandiose and vulnerable) 
differ in their relation to attachment and RF.  Thus, this examination will offer a preliminary step 
for determining whether adaptive and non-adaptive levels of narcissism are predictive of 
attachment status and the capacity for mentalization.  
The following aims and hypotheses are advanced to account for the expected differences: 
Aim 1: To examine the association between attachment style and narcissistic personality 




1. All three types of narcissism (vulnerable, grandiose, adaptive) will be positively and 
significantly associated with attachment-related anxiety and avoidance. However, 
pathological narcissism (vulnerable or grandiose) will be more strongly related to 
attachment-related anxiety and avoidance than will adaptive narcissism. 
 
Within the two subtypes of pathological narcissism: 
 
1a. Vulnerable narcissism will be positively and more strongly related to anxious attachment 
than will grandiose narcissism.  
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1b. Grandiose narcissism will be positively and more strongly related to avoidant attachment 
than will vulnerable narcissism. 
 
Aim 2: To examine the association between reflective functioning (RF) and narcissistic 
personality traits (vulnerable, grandiose, adaptive).  
 
Hypothesis 2:  
 
2. Pathological narcissism (vulnerable or grandiose) will be negatively and more strongly 
correlated with the capacity for reflective functioning (RF) than will adaptive narcissism.  
 
Within the two subtypes of pathological narcissism: 
 
2a. Vulnerable narcissism will be negatively and more strongly related to capacity for 
reflective functioning than will grandiose narcissism.  
 
2b. Grandiose narcissism will be negatively related to both Other-Mentalizing and Self-
Mentalizing. However, this negative relationship will be stronger for Self-Mentalizing.  
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS 
Overview 
For this study, participants were recruited from City University’s Department of Psychology 
Research Subject Pool. The CCNY Psychology Department’s website regularly posts ongoing 
studies, offering undergraduate students the opportunity to participate in current research projects. 
Participants must be at least 18 years of age and proficient in English in order to take part in the 
study. There were no other exclusion criteria. Participants received research credit for their 
participation. The study used an Internet based survey questionnaire to collect data. Informed 
consent was obtained from each participant through an online consent form. IRB approval was 
granted for all aspects of this study. 
 
Participants 
The sample is comprised of 345 participants, 36% are males and 64%, are females. On 
average, the sample is 21.08 years of age (sd = 5.15) and ranges from 18 to 63 years of age.  The 
sample is ethnically and racially diverse with most of the respondents of Hispanic (32%),    
Asian (30%), Caucasian (14%) or African-American (10%) backgrounds. The remainder of the 
sample (14%) is comprised of “other” ethnic / racial backgrounds which include Native 
Americans, Native Hawaiians/Pacific Islanders, Mixed Races and “Others”. With regard to their 
relationship statuses, 39% of the sample are currently in relationships, either dating or married, 
with the majority (61%) not currently in relationships, i.e., single (59%), divorced (1%) or 
separated (< 1%).  The socio-economic background of the participants, as operationalized by 
yearly parental household income, indicates that most of the sample is middle class or lower   
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(<= $50,000, 71%). With respect to religion, 29% report no religious affiliation, 36% identify as 
members of the Christian faith (Catholic or Protestant), 14% are Muslim, 7% are Hindus or 
Buddhists with the remainder of the sample (15%) reporting “Other” religious affiliations.  
Finally, 4% of the sample reports that they are currently in psychotherapy.   
 
Procedure 
The survey was converted into an electronic file and uploaded to a web-based data 
system specializing in Internet-based research for social science (see Appendix 1). Data were 
stored on a secure server to which only the principal investigator (PI) had access. The study used 
the working title “In What Way Are You Special?” and was uploaded to the CCNY Subject Pool. 
Interested participants who followed the link were presented with a detailed description of the 
research study, including the right to exit the survey at any time. Following the informed consent 
information, participants had the option to click “yes” to consent and to continue with the survey 
or “no” to decline participation and discontinue. A copy of the consent form is attached in 
Appendix 2.  At the end of the survey participants were presented with a debriefing section, 
offering more information on the study’s purpose and explaining that the study title “In What 
Way Are You Special?” was kept intentionally vague in order not to influence participants’ 
responses (see Appendix 3).  Participants were then offered a choice of allowing their data to be 
used for research purposes or withdrawing from the study altogether. Of four-hundred and thirty-
one (n=431) participants who began the survey, two (n=2) refused to provide consent, eighty-
three (n=83) failed to meet the criterion that they provide at least half of the information required 
for each measure, and one (n=1) requested that his/her data be removed from the database 
following the debriefing.  Every participant who consented received research credit, irrespective 
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of whether they completed the survey. Once data collection was complete, the information was 




The demographic questionnaire consisted of basic demographic questions such as gender, 
age, race/ethnicity, religion, parental household income, relationship status and whether 
participants were currently in psychotherapy.  
 
Grandiose Narcissism 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory –  (PNI) 
The PNI (Pincus et al., 2009) is a 52-item, multifactorial questionnaire that assesses 
seven dimensions of pathological narcissism: Contingent Self-Esteem (CSE); Exploitativeness 
(EXP); Self-Sacrificing Self-Enhancement (SSSE); Hiding the Self (HS); Grandiose Fantasy 
(GF); Devaluing (DEV) and Entitlement Rage (ER). Grandiose PNI subscales were associated 
with vindictive, domineering, intrusive, and overly nurturing interpersonal problems, and 
vulnerable PNI subscales were associated with cold, socially avoidant, and exploitable 
interpersonal problems (Pincus et al., 2009).  In a small clinical sample, PNI scales exhibited 
significant associations with parasuicidal behavior, suicide attempts, homicidal ideation, and 
several aspects of psychotherapy utilization. 
Confirmatory factor analysis supports the construct validity of the PNI as a measure of 
pathological narcissism (Pincus, Ansell, Pimentel, Cain, Wright, & Levy, 2009). The PNI 
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correlated negatively with self-esteem and empathy, and positively with shame, interpersonal 
distress, aggression, and borderline personality organization. 
 Each of the seven subscales demonstrated accepted levels of scale score reliability, CSE 
α=.95; EXP α=.84; SSSE α=.73; HS α=.80; GF α=.92; DEV α=.91; ER α=.91, (Tritt, Ryder, 
Ring & Pincus, 2010). In the current study, the internal consistency reliability of the “total” PNI 
scale score is α=.94 which is evidence of excellent reliability. 
 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory – Grandiosity 
The PNI grandiosity subscale, is comprised of three of the seven subscales, i.e.,  
Grandiose Fantasy (GF), Exploitative (EXP), Self-Sacrificing-Self-Enhancement (SSSE) that 
have been identified in previous confirmatory factor analyses as a higher order component 
reflecting narcissistic grandiosity (Wright et al., 2010). The grandiose subscales are correlated 
with other measures of grandiose narcissism, most notably the Exploitativeness and Entitlement 
(E/E) component of the NPI and manifest good internal consistency (Pincus et al., 2009).  In the 
current study these three scales (18 items) were used to operationalize grandiose narcissism. An 
internal consistency reliability analysis of the eighteen items finds that its reliability is quite 
satisfactory (α=.86).   
 
Vulnerable Narcissism 
Pathological Narcissism Inventory – Vulnerability  
The PNI’s (Pincus et al., 2009) remaining four subscales, Contingent Self Esteem (CSE), Hiding 
the Self (HS), Devaluing (DEV) and Entitlement Rage (ER), were identified in previous 
confirmatory analysis as the four sub-scales identifying vulnerable narcissism (Pincus et al., 
2009; Wright et al., 2010).  The vulnerable scales are correlated with other measures of 
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vulnerable narcissism and manifest good internal consistency (Pincus et al., 2009). In the current 
study these four scales (34 items) were used to operationalize vulnerable narcissism. The 34 
items comprising these four scales were submitted to an internal consistency reliability analysis. 
The Cronbach’s alpha coefficient is (α=.94) which indicates substantial reliability.   
 
Adaptive Narcissism 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) 
The NPI (Raskin & Terry, 1988) is a 40-item self-report inventory designed to measure 
trait narcissism in non-clinical populations. Each item presents a pair of self-attitude statements 
and respondents were asked to choose the one statement they agree with most (forced-choice). 
Previous factor analyses identified 33 items, represented by the three components 
Leadership/Authority (LA), Superiority/Arrogance (SA) and Self-Absorption/Self-Admiration 
(SS) as capturing healthy adaptive functioning (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Watson et al., 1992).  For 
this reason, in the current study only these three components (33 items) were used to 
operationalize adaptive narcissism. The fourth component, Exploitativeness and Entitlement (E/E, 
comprised of 7 items) identified by previous factor analysis as capturing the more pathological 
features of the narcissistic personality (Watson et al., 1992), was not included in the measure on 
adaptive narcissism used in this study. In the current study, the internal consistency reliability of 
this measure is  (α=.68), somewhat lower than has been the case for the other two measures of 
narcissism. In part, this may be the case because seven of the original 40 items have been deleted 
in this investigation.  
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Adult Attachment Measures 
Experience of Close Relationship Scale Revised (ECR-R) 
The ECR-R (Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998) is a 36-item self-report measure. Eighteen items 
comprise the attachment-related avoidant scale, measuring discomfort with interpersonal 
closeness and depending on others. The other half of the scale, an additional 18 items, comprises 
an attachment-related anxious style, measuring fear of rejection or abandonment by others. 
Participants were asked to indicate how true each statement was of their current or past 
relationships, using a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
The measure was scored in accordance with Brennan et al.’s (1998) scoring instructions for the 
two dimensions, Attachment Avoidance and Attachment Anxiety. Higher scores reflect greater 
avoidance/anxiety. Previous research confirms the high reliability and validity of the two ECR-R 
scales (Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). In the current study, the internal consistency reliability 
(alpha) coefficient for Anxious Attachment subscales was quite substantial (α=.90). The internal 
consistency reliability coefficient for Avoidant Attachment was lower, i.e., (α=.66). The 
correlation between the two scales in the study sample was r = -.05, p > .05 which indicates that 
the two subscales of the ECR are statistically independent as expected. 
 
Reflective Functioning 
Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ)  
The Reflective Functioning Questionnaire (RFQ; Moulton-Perkins, Rogoff, Luyten & 
Fonagy, 2011) is a 54-item self-report measure on the ability to perceive and interpret human 
behavior in terms of intentional mental states. It is currently under development but there is some 
preliminary psychometric information available albeit based on a preliminary, eighteen item 
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version of this measure. Using this preliminary measure, the internal consistency reliability 
coefficients for the RFQ18TOTAL (α=.82), RFQ18SELF (α=.75), and the RFQ18OTHER 
(α=.76)  support the reliability of this preliminary version of the RFQ54. In the same report 
validity data for the preliminary measure is provided in the form of “validity correlations” with 
other clinical measures. For example, convergent construct validation is supported by positive, 
statistically significant correlations with Empathy (r = .48, p < .001) and Mindfulness (r = .40,    
p < .001). Divergent construct validation is supported by statistically significant, negative 
correlations with a measure of Eating Disorders (r = -.36, p < .001), Disability (r = -.44, p < .001), 
Alexithymia     (r = -.37, p < .001), Borderline Personality Disorder (r = -.54, p < .001) and 
General Psychopathology (r = -.51, p < .001). In the current study, internal consistency reliability 
for the RFQ54TOTAL (α=.86), RFQ54SELF (α=.63), and the RFQ54OTHER (α=.75)  support 
the reliability of the RFQ54.  
 
Current Psychological Functioning Measure 
Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
The BSI (Derogatis, 1975) is a 53-item self-report measure of psychological symptoms 
that includes specific symptom scales and a global severity index (GSI). The BSI has been used 
to study the relations between these symptoms and an array of constructs.  In the context of the 
present study only the global severity index will be used. Based on the current study sample, its 
internal consistency reliability is excellent (α=.97).  
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Personality Disorder 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders–Personality Questionnaire 
(SCID-II-PQ). 
 The SCID-II-PQ (First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997) is a 119-item self-
report questionnaire designed to assess the diagnostic criteria for the DSM-IV PDs. Each 
criterion is being evaluated by specified questions and subsequent probes. This scale has been 
widely used in personality disorder research (Bagby, Vachon, Bulmash, & Quilty, 2008). In 
order to derive categorically based DSM-IV Axis II PD diagnoses, the SCID-II/PQ can be scored 
on dimensional symptom count scores. A diagnosis for any given personality disorder is 
conferred if the number of symptoms endorsed satisfies the diagnostic symptom criteria 
according to DSM-IV. The screening questionnaire version of the clinical interview is expected 
to produce a certain amount of false positives in comparison to interview ratings, but only few 
false negatives. Although its development was originally intended to save time in routine clinical 
practice, its format does offer considerable potential for use as a diagnostic screen in the context 
of a survey (Ullrich, Deasy, Smith, Johnson, Clarke, Broughton & Coid, 2008). 
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CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
1. Relationships Among Narcissism Measures: 
Prior to evaluating the study’s hypotheses, it is important to examine the relationships 
among the narcissism measures, which are the focal measures in the current investigation. As 
expected, the total score of the PNI, which incorporates both the grandiose and the vulnerable 
dimensions of pathological narcissism, is modestly, albeit significantly correlated with the 
adaptive narcissism scale which is the total score of the NPI measure minus the seven E/E items 
(r = .19, p < .001).  With respect to the subscales of the PNI, the grandiosity subscale is 
positively, moderately and significantly related to the adaptive narcissism scale (r = .34,               
p < .001) whereas, as expected, the vulnerable subscale displays no relationship to the adaptive 
narcissism measure (r = -.01, p = .91).  
The statistical significance of the difference between the correlations of grandiose 
subtype to adaptive (r = .34) and vulnerable subtype to adaptive (r = -.01) is shown by using 
Fisher's z-transformation. The resulting z-value of 4.77 (greater than +1.96) indicates that the 
difference between the two correlations is statistically significant. 
Finally, the two subscales of the pathological narcissism measure, again, grandiosity and 
vulnerability, are positively, moderately and significantly related to each other (r = .56, p < .001).  
The findings are summarized in Table 1: 
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Table	  1	  
Correlation	  Matrix	  among	  Narcissism	  Measures	  	  	  	   	  Pathological	  Narcissism	  	  (PNI	  Total)	  
	  Pathological	  	  	  Grandiosity	  	  (PNI	  subscale)	  
	  Pathological	  Vulnerability	  	  (PNI	  subscale)	  
	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  Pathological	  Narcissism	  	  (PNI	  Total)	  	  
	  1.00	   	  .880***	   	  .886***	   	  .189***	  
Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .880***	   	  1.00	   	  .558***	   	  .344***	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .886***	   	  .558***	   	  1.00	   	  -­‐.006	  	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	   	  .189***	   	  .344***	   	  -­‐.006	   	  1.00	  ***p	  <	  .001	   	   	   	   	  
 
 
2. Validity Correlations of Narcissism Measures: 
The following section presents selected correlations between narcissism, attachment, 
reflective functioning and various measures of psychopathology, i.e., selected scales and 
subscales from the Brief Symptom Inventory and the SCID Screening Measure. The purpose of 
this section is to explore the -convergent validity of the “core” measures used in this study. The 
validity correlations are presented in Table 2 below.  
The Brief Symptom Inventory was previously shown to be a valid and reliable measure 
of psychopathology. As such, it is almost certainly a “stronger” convergent validation criterion 
than is the SCID Screening Measure, which is mainly intended for use as a brief screening 
measure to be followed up with an interview administered by a clinician (Ullrich, Deasy, Smith, 
Johnson, Clarke, Broughton, & Coid, 2008).  Moreover, within the BSI, the GSI is the most 
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“global” measure of psychopathology available in this investigation. As such, we first consider 
the validity of the narcissism, attachment and reflective functioning measures, i.e., the “focal” 
measures in this investigation with respect to the BSI-GSI.  
As seen in Table 2 below, the pathological narcissism measures are positively and 
significantly related to the BSI-GSI measure, as expected. Specifically, pathological narcissism, 
which is comprised of both pathological grandiosity and pathological vulnerability, is positively, 
moderately strongly and significantly related to the BSI-GSI (r = .47, p < .001). Moreover, each 
of its components is also positively and significantly related to the BSI-GSI although the 
“strength” or magnitude of these associations, varies. That is, pathological vulnerability is 
moderately strongly, positively and significantly related to the BSI-GSI (r = .55, p < .001). 
Pathological grandiosity is somewhat more modestly correlated with this convergent validation 
measure (r = .28, p < .001).  As also displayed in this table, the three pathological narcissism 
measures are positively and consistently related to each of the selected BSI subscales in this table. 
Turning to the SCID Screening Measure as a validation criterion, the three pathological 
narcissism measures are, again, positively and significantly related to the Borderline Personality 
Disorder cluster as well as the broader Cluster B measure which not only includes Borderline 
Personality Disorder but also Histrionic, Narcissistic and Antisocial Personality Disorder. These 
correlations range from “modest” correlations (r = .24, p < .001) to generally “moderate” 
correlations (r >= .30).  
With respect to adaptive narcissism, note that its correlations with the array of 
psychopathology validation measures are generally insignificant and hover around zero. Perhaps 
the most salient comment about these correlations is that they are all less positive than those seen 
for the three pathological narcissism measures. That is to say, adaptive narcissism does not 
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“predict” psychopathology as do the pathological narcissism measures. In this sense, Pincus’ 
assertion that adaptive narcissism is discriminately different from pathological narcissism is 
supported by the differential pattern of correlations seen in this study (Pincus et al., 2009; Pincus 
& Lukowitsky, 2010). 
With respect to the attachment measures, the ECR-Anxiety subscale, as expected, 
exhibits positive, statistically significant correlations ranging in magnitude from “modest” to 
“moderate” with the various psychopathology validation measures. On the other hand, the ECR-
Avoidance subscale is not significantly or generally positively correlated with the 
psychopathology measures, contrary to expectation.    
Finally, with regard to the reflective functioning measures, these measures do not exhibit 
the expected negative correlations with the psychopathology validation measures. More 
specifically, and counter-intuitively, the reflective functioning total score is positively, albeit 
weakly, related to the BSI-GSI (r = .11, p = .04), BSI-Interpersonal Sensitivity (r = .12, p = .03), 
BSI-Obsessive-Compulsive (r = .17, p < .01) as well as the Borderline Personality Disorder 
cluster score of the SCID-II (r = .15, p < .01) and the Cluster B score (r = .18, p = .001). Neither 
of the subscale scores of the reflective functioning measure, i.e., Self- and Other-Mentalizing, 
generally exhibit significant correlations with either the Brief Symptom Inventory measures or 
the SCID Screening Measure components.   
The statistical significance of the difference between the correlations of vulnerable 
subtype to GSI (r = .55) and adaptive narcissism to GSI (r = -.034) and is shown by using 
Fisher's z-transformation. The resulting z-value of 8.53 (greater than +1.96) indicates that the 
difference between the two correlations is statistically significant. The z-value of grandiosity to 
GSI and adaptive to GSI is 4.18, which is less pronounced but statistically significant.  
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The findings are summarized in Table 2: 
 Table	  2	  
Validity	  (Pearson)	  Correlations	  Between	  Narcissism,	  Attachment,	  RF	  and	  the	  Brief	  Symptom	  Inventory	  and	  the	  
SCID	  –	  Screening	  Measure	  	  	  	   GSI	   BSI-­‐IS	   BSI-­‐OC	   BSI-­‐PHOB	   BSI-­‐PARAN	   BPD	   CLUSTER-­‐B	  Pathological	  Narcissism	  	  (PNI	  Total)	  	  
	  .468***	   	  .439***	   	  .361***	   	  .328***	   	  .417***	   	  .393***	   	  .341***	  
Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .278***	   	  .228***	   	  .192***	   	  .199***	   	  .280***	   	  .243***	   	  .289***	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .545***	   	  .543***	   	  .442***	   	  .377***	   	  .455***	   	  .449***	   	  .312***	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  
	  -­‐.034	   	  -­‐.095	   	  -­‐.084	   	  .005	   	  .080	   	  .022	   	  .151*	  
ECR	  –	  	  Anxiety	  	   	  .392***	   	  .367***	   	  .339***	   	  .252***	   	  .268***	   	  .415***	   	  .277***	  ECR	  –	  	  Avoidance	  	  	   	  -­‐.051	   	  -­‐.029	   	  .017	   	  -­‐.006	   	  -­‐.108*	   	  .016	   	  .091	  RF-­‐	  Total	  	   .110*	   .116*	   .166**	   -­‐.002	   .009	   .154**	   .183***	  RF	  –	  Self	  	   -­‐.054	   .014	   -­‐.007	   -­‐.085	   -­‐.083	   -­‐.046	   .005	  RF	  –	  Other	  	   .015	   .005	   .087	   -­‐.076	   -­‐.021	   .047	   .148**	  
Note. N=345. GSI=Global Severity Index; BSI-IS=Brief Symptom Inventory-Interpersonal Sensitivity; 
BSI-OC= Brief Symptom Inventory-Obsession-Compulsion; BSI-PHOB= Brief Symptom Inventory-
Phobic Anxiety; BSI-PARAN= Brief Symptom Inventory-Paranoid Ideation; BPD=Borderline 
Personality Disorder on SCID Screening Measure; Cluster B=Histrionic, Borderline, Narcissistic and 
Antisocial Personality Disorder on SCID Screening Measure. 
*p< .05; **p< .01; ***p < .001 
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3. A Priori Hypotheses on Narcissism and Attachment: 
Hypothesis 1 predicted that pathological narcissism (grandiose or vulnerable) would be 
positively and more strongly related to attachment-related anxiety and avoidance than would 
adaptive narcissism.  
This hypothesis was largely supported for attachment anxiety, but not for attachment avoidance. 
 
Correlational Analysis for Anxious Attachment: 
At the bivariate level, each of the three measures of narcissism is significantly related to 
anxious attachment. Specifically, pathological vulnerability is positively, moderately, and 
significantly related to anxious attachment (r = .48, p < .001), as is pathological grandiosity        
(r = .22, p < .001), although the former is noticeably larger. Adaptive narcissism is also 
significantly related to anxious attachment (r = -.21, p < .001) although its magnitude, like 
pathological grandiosity, is modest. Interestingly, this relationship is inverse rather than direct 
and indicates that individuals reporting higher levels of adaptive narcissism are less, not more, 
anxious in their relationships.  
The statistical significance of the difference between the correlations of vulnerable 
subtype to ECR-Anxiety (r = .48) and adaptive narcissism to ECR-Anxiety (r = -.21) and is 
shown by using Fisher's z-transformation. The resulting z-value of 9.53 (greater than +1.96) 
indicates that the difference between the two correlations is statistically significant. The z-value 
of grandiosity to ECR-Anxiety and adaptive to ECR-Anxiety is 5.68, which is less pronounced 
but statistically significant. 
The findings are displayed in Table 3: 
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Table	  3	  
Pearson	  Correlations	  Among	  ECR-­‐Attachment	  Anxiety,	  Pathological	  Grandiosity,	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  	  	   ECR-­‐Anxiety	   Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  	  ECR-­‐Anxiety	  	   	  1.00	   	  .219***	   	  .475***	   	  -­‐.209***	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .219***	   	  1.00	   	  .558***	   	  .344***	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .475***	   	  .558***	   	  1.00	   	  -­‐.006	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  
	  -­‐.209***	   	  .344***	   	  -­‐.006	   	  1.00	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Multiple Regression Analysis for Anxious Attachment: 
A hierarchical, multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to estimate the 
relative predictive power associated with pathological and adaptive narcissism. The two 
pathological predictors, taken as a “set”, are significantly related to, i.e., predictive of, anxious 
attachment (R2Change =  .23, F = 52.68, df = (2,341), p < .001). Although this is also the case for 
adaptive narcissism (R2Change =  .04, F = 18.91, df = (1,341), p = .000), the relative predictive 
power of the two measures of pathological narcissism is considerably greater than that of 
adaptive narcissism, which is consistent with the claim made in hypothesis 1.  
 
Hypothesis 1a predicted that vulnerable narcissism would be positively and more strongly 
related to anxious attachment than would grandiose narcissism, controlling for adaptive 
narcissism.  This hypothesis was fully supported. 
A more focused examination of the specific components of pathological narcissism via 
inspection of the standardized partial regression coefficients (“beta weights”), finds that 
vulnerable narcissism (β = .45, p < .001) is, as predicted, more strongly related to anxious 
attachment than is grandiose narcissism.  Grandiose narcissism is neither positively nor 
significantly related to anxious attachment (β = .04, p  = .47).   
Adaptive narcissism is, contrary to expectation, negatively, significantly albeit weakly, 
related to anxious attachment (β = -.22, p < .001). In other words, higher levels of adaptive 
narcissism correlate with lower scores on attachment anxiety. 
To conclude, pathological narcissism is a stronger predictor of anxious attachment than is 
adaptive narcissism but only vulnerable narcissism is positively and significantly related to 
attachment anxiety. The findings are summarized in Table 4: 
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Table	  4	  	  
Hierarchical	  Regression	  of	  ECR-­‐Attachment	  Anxiety	  on	  Pathological	  
Grandiosity,	  Pathological	  Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  	  
	  Variable	  	   B	   SE	  (B)	   β	   	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .067	   	  .092	   	  .044	   	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .659	   	  .085	   	  .449***	   	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI-­‐E/E)	  	  
	  -­‐.063	   	  0.15	   	  -­‐.222**	   	  




Hypothesis 1b predicted that grandiose narcissism would be positively and more strongly related 
to avoidant attachment than will vulnerable narcissism.  
This hypothesis was not supported by the current findings. 
 
Correlational Analysis for Avoidant Attachment:    
At the bivariate level, contrary to expectations, neither of the pathological aspects of narcissism, 
i.e., vulnerability (r = .05, p = .36) and grandiosity (r = -.02, p = .72), displays any relationship to 
attachment avoidance.    
The findings are summarized in Table 5. 
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Table	  5	  
Pearson	  Correlations	  Among	  ECR-­‐Attachment	  Avoidance,	  Pathological	  Grandiosity,	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  	  	   ECR-­‐Avoidance	   Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  	  ECR-­‐Avoidance	  	   	  1.00	   	  .050	   	  -­‐.019	   	  .148	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .050	   	  1.00	   	  .558**	   	  .344***	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  -­‐.019	   	  .558**	   	  1.00	   	  -­‐.006	  
***p < .001 
**p < .01 
 
 
Multiple Regression Analysis for Avoidant Attachment: 
 
Again, a hierarchical, multiple regression analysis was conducted to estimate the relative 
predictive power associated with pathological and adaptive narcissism. The two pathological 
predictors, taken as a “set”, are not significantly related to, i.e., predictive of, avoidant 
attachment (R2Change  =  .00, F = 0.09, df = (2,341), p  = .92). However, this is not the case for   
adaptive narcissism (R2Change =  .02, F = 5.78, df = (1,341), p < .02), which is statistically 
significant but rather modestly related to avoidant attachment.  Visual inspection of the specific 
components of pathological narcissism via the standardized partial regression coefficients finds 
that both vulnerable narcissism (β = -.03, p = .68) and grandiose narcissism (β = .02, p = .82) 
confirm the set-wise result reported above.  With respect to adaptive narcissism, its relationship 
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to avoidant attachment is, as reported above, statistically significant but rather modest (β = .14, p 
= .02).  
By way of summary, contrary to expectation, pathological narcissism is not a stronger 
predictor of avoidant attachment than is adaptive narcissism. In fact, the standardized regression 
coefficients for both vulnerable and grandiose narcissism are statistically insignificant. With 
respect to adaptive narcissism, and consistent with expectation, it is positively and significantly 
related to avoidant attachment although modestly so.   
The findings are summarized in Table 6. 
 Table	  6	  
Hierarchical	  Regression	  of	  ECR-­‐Attachment	  Avoidance	  on	  Pathological	  
Grandiosity,	  Pathological	  Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  	  
	  Variable	  	   B	   SE	  (B)	   β	   	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .014	   	  .061	   	  .016	   	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  -­‐.023	   	  .056	   	  -­‐.028	   	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  
	  -­‐.023	   	  .019	   	  .142*	   	  
*p < .05 
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4.  A Priori Hypotheses on Narcissism and Reflective Functioning (RF): 
Hypotheses 2 predicted that pathological narcissism (vulnerable or grandiose) would be 
negatively and more strongly correlated with the capacity for reflective functioning (RF) than 
would adaptive narcissism.   This hypothesis was unsupported by the findings. 
 
Correlational Analysis for RF: 
At the bivariate level, two of the three measures of narcissism are significantly related to 
reflective functioning. Contrary to expectation, pathological grandiosity exhibits no relationship 
to reflective functioning (r = .06, p = .31).  Also, pathological vulnerability is, counter-intuitively, 
positively albeit weakly and significantly related to reflective functioning (r = .14, p = < .02). 
However, consistent with expectation, adaptive narcissism is negatively, again weakly and 
significantly related to reflective functioning (r = -.13, p < .02). See Table 7 below.  
Table	  7	  
Pearson	  Correlations	  Among	  Reflective	  Functioning	  (RF),	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  and	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  	  	  	   RF	  Total	   Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  	  RF	  Total	  	  	   	  1.00	   	  .055	   	  .135*	   	  -­‐.133*	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .055	   	  1.00	   	  .558***	   	  .344***	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  .135*	   	  .558***	   	  1.00	   	  -­‐.006	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	   	  -­‐.133*	   	  .344***	   	  -­‐.006	   	  1.00	  
*p < .05; ***p < .001  
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Multiple Regression Analysis for RF: 
A hierarchical, multiple regression analysis was conducted in order to estimate the relative 
predictive power associated with pathological and adaptive narcissism. The two pathological 
predictors, taken as a “set”, are significantly related to, i.e., predictive of, reflective functioning 
(R2Change  = .02, F = 3.38, df = (2,341), p < .04). This is also the case for adaptive narcissism 
(R2Change  =  .02, F = 6.34, df = (1,341), p < .02), but relative predictive power of the two 
measures of pathological narcissism is essentially the same as that of adaptive narcissism, which 
is inconsistent with the claim made in hypothesis 2. 
 
Hypotheses 2a predicted that - within the two subtypes of pathological narcissism - vulnerable 
narcissism would be negatively and more strongly related to reflective functioning than would 
grandiose narcissism.  
This hypothesis was not supported by the findings. 
 
A focused examination of the specific components of pathological narcissism via inspection of 
the standardized partial regression coefficients (“beta weights”), finds that vulnerable narcissism 
(β = .11, p < .11) is not, as predicted, significantly related to reflective functioning. Also, 
pathological grandiosity is not significantly related to reflective functioning (β = .05, p  = .52).  
By way of summary, contrary to expectation, pathological narcissism is not a stronger 
predictor of reflective functioning than is adaptive narcissism. Neither pathological narcissism 
nor adaptive narcissism is a predictor of reflective functioning. Only adaptive narcissism is 
significantly, albeit weakly associated with RF.  
The findings are summarized in Table 8. 
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Table	  8	  
Hierarchical	  Regression	  of	  Reflective	  Functioning	  (RF)	  on	  Pathological	  
Grandiosity,	  Pathological	  Vulnerability	  and	  Adaptive	  Narcissism	  	  
	  Variable	  	   B	   SE	  (B)	   Β	   	  Pathological	  Grandiosity	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  2.064	   	  3.226	   	  .045	   	  
Pathological	  Vulnerability	  (PNI	  subscale)	  	  
	  4.853	   	  2.958	  	   	  .109	   	  
Adaptive	  Narcissism	  (NPI	  -­‐	  E/E)	  	  
	  -­‐1.279	   	  .508	   	  -­‐.147*	   	  




Hypothesis 2b predicted that grandiose narcissism would be negatively related to both Other-
Mentalizing and Self-Mentalizing. However, this negative relationship was predicted to be 
stronger for Self-Mentalizing.   
This hypothesis was not supported by the data. 
 
The partial correlations between each of the two dimensions of reflective functioning and 
grandiosity are not significant. Specifically, the partial correlation between pathological 
grandiosity and Self-Mentalizing, controlling for Other-Mentalizing is partial r = -.02, p = .74. 
Similarly, the partial correlation between pathological grandiosity and Other-Mentalizing, 
controlling for Self-Mentalizing is partial r = .00, p = .99. Neither of the two dimensions of 
reflective functioning is negatively related to pathological grandiosity and neither partial 
correlation is statistically significant.  
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Table 9:  
Comparison of Narcissism Subtypes by Race / Ethnicity 
 N Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Pathological Narcissism African American 36 1.54 .60 
Hispanic 109 1.49 .67 
White 47 1.55 .61 
Asian 102 1.67 .67 
 
Pathological Grandiosity African American 36 1.86 .69 
Hispanic 109 1.76 .74 
White 47 1.81 .74 
Asian 102 1.86 .74 
 
Pathological Vulnerability African American 36 1.22 .71 
Hispanic 109 1.23 .76 
White 47 1.28 .66 
Asian 102 1.48 .75 
 
Adaptive Narcissism  African American 36 9.26 3.77 
Hispanic 109 8.50 38 
White 47 7.76 4.20 
Asian 102 6.69 3.65 
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CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
The present study assessed the relationship of three distinct narcissistic expressions 
(grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) to attachment style and the capacity for reflective functioning 
(RF). This project has generated two important clusters of findings: 1) In this sample, 
pathological levels of narcissism are predictive for anxious attachment, but not for avoidant 
attachment. Adaptive narcissism, on the other hand, appears to offset [mitigate] attachment 
anxiety. 2) The three expressions of narcissism (grandiose, vulnerable, adaptive) are not 
distinguishable by levels of reflective functioning.  These results will be discussed in detail 
below.  
1. Differentiating between narcissistic expressions 
Prior to a more in-depth discussion of the results pertaining to the study’s core 
hypotheses, it is essential to take a closer look at the pattern of convergence and divergence 
among the three narcissistic expressions. Correlational analysis explored the relationship 
between the narcissism measures used in this study. The present findings contribute to the 
growing evidence of divergent conceptualization of pathological versus adaptive narcissism. The 
PNI was constructed with the intention to assess the more vulnerable characteristics of 
narcissism in the clinical literature that were not assessed by the NPI or other measures 
emphasizing overt grandiosity (Cain, Pincus & Ansell, 2008). In the present study, as expected, 
the PNI total score was only modestly correlated with the NPI minus the 
Entitlement/Exploitation (E/E) factor (previous research has shown that the NPI E/E factor 
represents the core of pathological narcissism, e.g. Emmons, 1984, 1987; Watson et al., 1992; 
Besser & Priel, 2010).  
More importantly, the PNI vulnerable subscale exhibited no correlation at all with the 
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NPI. These findings support the claim by recent clinical theory and research that adaptive and 
pathological narcissistic expressions display potentially distinct dimensions of personality 
(Pincus et al., 2009; Tritt et al., 2010; Miller at al., 2010).    
It is important to keep in mind that in this study, the NPI scoring procedure was 
intentionally manipulated by leaving out those items that comprise the Entitlement/Exploitative 
(E/E) NPI factor, due to their association with maladjustment (Watson et al., 2005). The NPI 
total score has been repeatedly criticized as reflecting a confusing mix of adaptive and 
maladaptive content (Emmons, 1984, 1987; Watson, 2005; Tritt et al., 2009).  Other researchers 
have previously recommended manipulating the NPI measure to assess both “healthy” and 
“unhealthy” forms of narcissism (e.g. Horton, Bleau, & Drwecki, 2006).  Besser and Priehl 
(2010), for example, extracted and used solely the E/E subscale to measure grandiose narcissism, 
denoting the NPI Entitlement/Exploitative element as the “core of pathological narcissism”      (p. 
884).   
Associations with relevant convergent constructs in the current study for both 
pathological and adaptive expressions of narcissism exhibited a pattern in line with this claim.   
While pathological narcissism (PNI), and in particular its vulnerability subscale, were highly 
correlated with themes of psychological dysfunction (.47 and .55 respectively), adaptive 
narcissism [NPI minus E/E] displayed no correlational pattern with overall dysfunctional 
symptomatology. These convergent correlates of the present study provide further evidence that 
the NPI hones in on more adaptive personality characteristics, by assessing a self-confident, non-
distressed, yet arrogant self presentation (see also Miller & Campbell, 2008).   It is also possible 
that adaptive narcissists are generally less aware of their symptoms as well as less likely to report 
any self-perception that could be interpreted as weak or negative (this aspect is discussed in more 
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detail under ‘Limitations’ below).  
With regard to borderline personality organization, the results of this study displayed 
moderately strong correlational patterns between pathological narcissism (PNI total score), in 
particular its vulnerability subtype, and BPD (.39 and .45 respectively). Miller and his colleagues 
(2010) recently analyzed the overlap between these constructs and identified a construct that they 
labeled “Vulnerable Dark Triad,” comprised of Vulnerable Narcissism, Factor 2 
Psychopathology and BPD. They found that Vulnerable Narcissism manifested a nomological 
network that was nearly identical to the BPD’s “net” with similarity scores for vulnerable 
narcissism and BPD across 65 correlates as .93, suggesting nearly identical patterns of correlates 
(Miller at al., 2010). Recent empirical literature concerning heterogeneity within narcissism has 
shown that vulnerable narcissism scores are significantly related to BPD symptomatology 
(Pincus et al., 2009; Miller & Campbell, 2008). The current study adds to our understanding of 
how these two disorders are related and highlights, in particular, the overlap between the 
vulnerable narcissistic subtype and BPD. This speaks to the importance of continuing the work 
on expanding the DSM-IV predominantly grandiose diagnostic criteria in order to more 
accurately assess vulnerable NPD.     
A closer look at the grandiosity subtype in the present sample, revealed a much more 
moderate correlational pattern (.24) with BPD. Most notably, however, adaptive narcissism as 
measured by the NPI-33, manifested null effects with borderline personality symptomatology in 
the present study.  Adding the current findings to the extant literature on narcissism’s 
heterogeneity problem, lends further support to the argument that different pathways may lead to 
more broadly observable narcissistic attitudes and behavior.  Arrogant and aggressive behavior 
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in individuals high on adaptive narcissism may be exercised manipulatively, but in a more 
controlled manner and for specific instrumental reasons (status, financial gain), whereas 
individuals who present with vulnerable narcissism may be more dependent on primitive 
narcissistic defenses for their overall affect and self regulation. In an empirical study on NPD 
and BPD treatment refractory patients, Clemence, Perry and Plakun (2009) analyzed the defenses 
associations and found that NPD patients predominantly used devaluation, omnipotence and 
idealization, while repression was negatively related to NPD. The authors also noted that NPD 
was significantly and negatively related to overall defensive functioning when BPD was 
partialled out (Clemence et al., 2009). 
These findings serve as valuable contributions to narcissism research and clinical practice 
from a number of perspectives: First, they provide further evidence for the need of a better 
defined phenotypic differentiation between adaptive and pathological narcissism in future 
theoretical and empirical work on narcissistic personality. Second, results of this study suggest 
that of the three narcissistic expressions (adaptive, grandiose, vulnerable), it is foremost 
narcissistic vulnerability that is associated with dysfunctional symptomatology, severe 
personality pathology and attachment anxiety. This association between narcissistic vulnerability 
and psychopathology suggests an urgent need to widen the current DSM-IV NPD criteria to 
include and better capture patients who present predominantly with vulnerable characteristics. 
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2. Pathological Narcissism and Anxious Attachment 
The results in this study replicated the established two-dimensional model of pathological 
narcissism as comprised of narcissistic grandiosity and narcissistic vulnerability (Wright, 
Lukowitsky, Pincus, & Conroy, 2010; Cain et al., 2008; Pincus et al., 2009; Pincus & 
Lukowitsky, 2009). Of the two components of pathological narcissism the vulnerable subtype 
was found to be a moderately strong predictor of anxious attachment (.48), whereas grandiose 
narcissism was only modestly predictive of attachment anxiety (.22), and the NPI-33 (“adaptive” 
narcissism) even exhibited a negative correlation (-.20).  These differences in the associations of 
vulnerable, grandiose and adaptive narcissism to attachment anxiety suggest that the defenses 
available in vulnerable narcissism do not serve as a sufficient protection against relationship 
anxiety. In contrast, defenses seem to function moderately well for those with grandiose 
narcissism, and even more efficiently for those with adaptive narcissism, where there is an 
inverse relationship between narcissistic traits and attachment anxiety.  In sum, the current 
findings support the conceptual distinction between vulnerable, grandiose and adaptive 
expressions of narcissism, and are consistent with recent research on different phenotypic 
presentations of narcissistic pathology (Miller at al, 2010; Tritt et al., 2010, Besser & Priel, 2010; 
Pincus et al, 2009; Dickinson & Pincus, 2003).  
Taken together, this body of work suggests that individuals who are high on vulnerable 
narcissism are more sensitive to interpersonal rejection and hyper-vigilant for perceived criticism 
from others than are grandiose or adaptive narcissists.   The current results add further empirical 
support to Tritt et al.’s (2010) affective reaction model associated with narcissistic coping 
strategies.  Tritt and her colleagues (2010) regard vulnerability items as indicators of negative 
affect when a narcissistic need is not met, whereas grandiosity items are seen as a reflection of 
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positive affect associated with narcissistic self-enhancement strategies.  In their sample of 
university students, they found that narcissistic vulnerability significantly predicted depressive 
and anxious temperament, an effect that remained after controlling for narcissistic grandiosity.   
These findings further support the research that found individuals with vulnerable NPD to be 
more symptomatic and more likely to be help seeking as well as to stay in treatment (e.g. Russ et 
al., 2008). 
A closer look at some external trait associations of the two PNI scales may help to view 
the present findings in the context of a more nuanced clinical picture. Vulnerable characteristics 
(Contingent Self-Esteem, Hiding the Self, Devaluing, Entitlement Rage) correlate positively with 
feelings of shame and identity diffusion and negatively with self-esteem (Cain et al., 2008; 
Pincus et al., 2009).  The positive relationship between high scores on Attachment Anxiety and 
maladaptive affective laden interpersonal style is largely consistent with past research (Fraley & 
Shaver, 1998; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002).  
Ronningstam (2009, p.113) aptly described the vulnerable narcissist as being “inhibited, 
shame-ridden, and hypersensitive shy type, whose low tolerance for attention from others and 
hypervigilant readiness for criticism or failure makes him/her more socially passive…”.   The 
present study provides empirical foundation for this clinical observation by showing how 
individuals with vulnerable narcissism are more prone to affective dysregulation in the context of 
interpersonal relationships than are grandiose or adaptive narcissists.   These findings couple 
well with recent research linking grandiose versus vulnerable narcissism to emotional reactivity. 
Besser and Priel (2010) found that high levels of vulnerable narcissism were significantly 
associated with greater change in negative outcomes in the face of a high-level interpersonal 
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threat, but not a high-level achievement threat. In contrast, in the high achievement-threat group, 
but not in the high interpersonal-threat group, grandiose narcissism significantly predicted 
greater change in negative outcomes (Besser & Priel, 2010).   
Attachment theory holds that adults with higher levels of attachment anxiety report 
fearful experiences when significant others were not available during times of need (Ainsworth, 
1989; Bowlby, 1980; Fraley & Shaver, 1998; Shaver & Mikulincer, 2002). The present results 
suggest that the narcissistic vulnerability in anxiously attached individuals expresses itself 
through feelings of rejection and fear of abandonment when narcissistic needs are not met by 
important others.   This constant vigilance and hypersensitivity with respect to acceptance and 
reinforcement by important others is more reflective of anxious cognitions and the need for 
reassurance and recognition in interpersonal transactions.  By contrast, attachment avoidance is 
marked by continual direction of attention away from attachment relationships, which are 
experienced as discomfort.  In considering the clinical ramifications of this, vulnerable 
narcissists may present with heightened emotional sensitivity in patient-therapist interactions, 
whereas grandiose narcissists may approach therapy in a competitive mindset in which early 
termination or no-shows are equated with “winning.”  This is supported by a recent study on 
maladaptive schema, in which, Ziegler-Hill, Gree, Arnau, Sisemore, and Myers (2011) found 
that Grandiosity was negatively correlated with the Defectiveness schema domain and positively 
related to the Entitlement schema domain reflecting the attitude of perfect self-mastery and free 
self-determination. Whereas Vulnerability was associated with Emotional Inhibition and 
Unrelenting Standards suggesting unrealistically high expectations of significant others coupled 
with pronounced sensitivity for emotional reactions of others, which are easily interpreted as 
slights or rejection.   
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 On a whole, these results provide additional support for the need to improve the clinical 
distinctions between vulnerable and grandiose narcissism and are in line with the findings of 
Besser and Priel (2010), who showed that the vulnerable narcissism dimension was significant in 
the face of threat of interpersonal rejection, with a specific effect on emotional reactivity in the 
face of the high-level threat of interpersonal rejection. They found that grandiose narcissism, in 
contrast, had only specific associations with emotional reactivity in the high-level threat of 
achievement failure.  
 Thus, it appears that the differences in the patterns of associations between 
grandiose and vulnerable narcissism load onto different self-regulation pathways. More 
specifically, these differences suggest the possibility that affect regulation in vulnerable 
narcissism is conducted via a search for non- critical acceptance and unquestioning validation 
from others whose continuous approval becomes crucial for self functioning. On the other hand 
grandiose narcissism thrives on external validation that is derived directly from the notion of 
success through competition and achievement (expressed by e.g. status, title, appearance, money). 
In this constellation, the grandiose narcissist relegates others to serve as mere facilitators in 
achieving these defined goals. 
3. Pathological Narcissism and Attachment Avoidance 
Results of this study, however, did not indicate a relationship between pathological 
narcissism and attachment avoidance. It has been suggested that the lack of significant findings 
regarding attachment avoidance may be partly attributed to the fact that avoidant individuals are 
less attentive to material with emotional, attachment-related themes, and as a result, avoidant 
individuals have greater difficulty relating to such material (Edelstein, 2006).  An additional 
explanation for the lack of a relationship between pathological narcissism and avoidant 
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attachment may be due to self-selection of the present sample. City College students are free to 
choose among a wide range of research studies offered by the Psychology department in 
exchange for field credit (and, as required by IRB rules, have the option to select alternative 
ways of obtaining required research experience). It is conceivable that individuals with avoidant 
attachment prefer emotionally neutral questionnaires and are therefore less likely to select a 
survey announcing in its ‘study description’ that it “will ask about ideas and feelings you have 
about yourself and others”.  At the same time, however, the study’s title “In what way are you 
special?” might have appealed to individuals high on narcissistic traits and avoidant attachment 
status. 
In consideration of measurement issues, the range of scores obtained in this sample 
supports the validity of the statistical findings. It should be noted, however, that while the 
internal consistency reliability (alpha) coefficient for Anxious Attachment subscales was quite 
substantial (α=.90), the internal consistency reliability coefficient for Avoidant Attachment was 
lower than ideal (α=.66). While the large discrepancy between the two alphas remains unclear, a 
closer examination of the items in the Avoidance subscale revealed that statements that are 
formulated in the negative, e.g. “I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners” or “I prefer not 
to show a partner how I feel deep down,” showed particularly high inconsistency ratings with 
respect to the overall scale. The Anxiety subscale contains only one negatively phrased item, 
whereas the Avoidance subscales contains five.  It might be conceivable that participants, 
especially learners of English as a second language, were confused when contrasting these 
negative statements to the 7-point scale ranging from 1= strongly disagree to 7 = strongly agree, 
which unduly influenced the scale’s internal consistency reliability.  
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 Moving beyond this study sampling and selection considerations by taking into account  
available empirical data on NPD and attachment correlations leaves us with a similar dearth of 
significant findings. Brennan and Shaver (1998) administered attachment and personality 
measures to 1,407 adolescents and young adults and found that narcissistic personality disorder 
was not significantly associated with any one attachment style.  Using a clinical sample of 149 
psychiatric adult inpatient and outpatients, Meyer et al (2001) reported that while narcissistic 
personality disorder features correlated inversely with secure attachment, it did not correlate with 
attachment prototypes signifying preoccupied attachment or avoidant-dismissive attachment. In a 
recent study involving 273 undergraduate students, Sherry, Lyddon and Henson (2007) 
concluded that narcissistic personality disorder - as measured by the MCMI-III (Millon Clinical 
Multiaxial Inventory III, Millon, Davis and Millon, 1997) – was not predictive of any particular 
attachment style.  Adding the current study’s insignificant findings to the existing body of 
research provides further evidence for the heterogeneity of narcissism as currently defined.     
4. Adaptive Narcissism and Attachment 
The results of this study provided further confirmation for the validity of the adaptive 
narcissistic subtype. In this sample, adaptive narcissists (NPI minus E/E factor) exhibited zero 
correlations with overall dysfunctional symptomatology as measured by the BSI and SCID-II 
screening questionnaires. With respect to interpersonal functioning this trend is even enhanced, 
as the current findings portray adaptive narcissism, contrary to expectation, as negatively, albeit 
weakly, related to anxious attachment.  In other words, higher scores of adaptive narcissisms are 
predictive of lower attachment anxiety. In some ways the present empirical data supports clinical 
observations and case studies of the adaptive narcissist’s overly self-enhancing and outwardly 
confident self-perception in close relationships.  The denial of interpersonal distress in the 
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present study also fits well with classical theory on narcissism that emphasizes the self-absorbed 
and unrealistic view these individuals have of themselves in relation to others and their tendency 
to downplay or altogether dismiss interpersonal difficulties (Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971, 1977), 
even earning them the label “oblivious narcissists” to distinguish them from their more sensitive 
and vulnerable counterparts (Gabbard, 1989).  
 In the past, researchers on narcissism who included attachment measures in their studies 
consistently found, sometimes unexpectedly, strong relationships between grandiose presentation 
and secure attachment styles. Dickenson and Pincus (2003), who in this particular study used the 
NPI total score to determine Grandiosity, reported that a majority of the grandiose group selected 
Secure (60%) or Dismissive (16%) rather than Fearful (13%) or preoccupied (10%) attachment 
styles.  These results are largely replicated by the present study, albeit it under different labels. 
Note that Dickenson and Pincus (2003) labeled the construct measured by the total NPI score 
“Grandiosity,” whereas the present study labeled the construct measured by the NPI minus E/E  
(Entitlement/Exploitation) as “Adaptive.” Given that its most maladaptive subscale was removed 
from the NPI scale, attachment difficulties were expected to be much lower than for the 
pathological narcissism measures. It is, however, not completely surprising to find an inverse, 
albeit weak, relationship between narcissistic traits and anxious attachment. Narcissism as 
defined by a purposefully modified NPI scale (minus E/E) might primarily capture the high on 
achievement motivation and self esteem and resistant to feedback and disconfirming of positive 
self-views- style (Morf, 2005; Paulhus & Williams, 2002), whereas the grandiose self-enhancing 
prone to manipulation, interpersonally aggressive and dominant type might have been largely 
filtered out by traits of entitlement and exploitativeness (E/E). The present findings couple well 
with Becker’s (2008) research on narcissism and object relations who found, contrary to 
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expectation, negative correlations between the NPI and object relation deficits.  Similarly, 
Feintuch (1999) predicted negative correlations between NPI and secure attachment but found 
correlations opposite the prediction. Smolewska and Dion (2005) found significant correlations 
between vulnerable narcissism (as measured by the HSNS) and attachment anxiety, but no 
significantly shared variance between grandiose narcissism (as measured by the NPI) and 
attachment domains.  Interestingly, when comparing attachment status using the Adult 
Attachment Interview (AAI) in a sample of adult female borderline patients with and without co-
morbid narcissistic personality disorder, Diamond and colleagues (in press) found that it was 
more difficult to discern a consistent attachment strategy. The NPD/BPD group was more likely 
to be categorized as ‘dismissing/avoidant’ in the AAI classification than were BPD patients 
without NPD, who were more likely to be classified as unresolved (U) and preoccupied 
(Diamond, Levy, Clarkin, Fischer-Kern, Cain, & Doering, in press). 
Thus, in line with existing research, the present study further weakens the ties between adaptive 
narcissistic traits and interpersonal maladjustment. Taken together, this body of work suggests 
that, across non-clinical samples, high scores on adaptive narcissism are not predictive of 
attachment difficulties. While this may well be partly explained by this populations’ proneness to 
distorted self-enhancing reporting, this aspect does not account for the whole picture. Todays’ 
fast growing research on personality disorders and personality traits has by now generated a 
substantial amount of correlational data across narcissistic traits and general personality 
inventories to allow for distinct and meaningful patterns to emerge. For example, high NPI 
scores are negatively associated with shame (Cain et al., 2008) and positively associated with 
achievement and self-esteem (Lukowitsky et al., 2007; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Watson, Little, 
Sawrie, & Biderman, 1992). Miller and Campbell (2008) have pointed out that NPI narcissism 
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captured an emotionally resilient, extroverted form.  With regard to impulsivity, grandiosity (as 
measured by the NPI) correlates positively with positive affect-based impulsivity and ‘sensation 
seeking’ and exhibited a negative correlation with interpersonal sensitivity (Miller at al., 2010).  
In terms of emotional reactions to threats, Besser & Priel (2010) found that grandiose narcissism 
significantly predicted negative outcomes in the high achievement-threat group, but not in the 
high interpersonal-threat group.  
Individuals high on adaptive narcissism represent personality traits  (e.g. high 
extraversion, manipulativeness) and outcomes (e.g. high self esteem, assertiveness) that make 
them appear more psychologically robust (Sedikis et al., 2004) and even earned them the label 
“disagreeable extraverts” (Paulhus, 2001). The current investigation adds further support to the 
notion that adaptive narcissism captures a conceptually different phenotype than pathological 
narcissism.  
 
5.  Narcissism and Reflective Functioning (RF) 
Correlational analysis explored whether more pathological expressions of narcissism 
were related to greater impairment in RF. The findings from the current study do not support the 
hypothesis that there is a relationship between pathological grandiosity and reflective functioning. 
Contrary to expectation, pathological vulnerability exhibits a positive, albeit a very weak 
relationship to RF.   However, adaptive narcissism was found to be negatively, but again weakly, 
related to reflective functioning.  
  
 
	   89	  
The following are possible explanations of these, somewhat counter-intuitive, findings:  
1) Contrary to expectations, in the pathologically grandiose narcissistic population the 
relationship between the capacity for mentalization and symptom severity is not a linear one.     
2) There does in fact exist a linear positive relationship between the pathological grandiosity 
construct and mentalization impairment, but the measure used in this study is unable to detect it 
due to an inherent measurement weakness.  
 
Exploring grandiose narcissism’s heterogeneity with respect to mentalization: It should 
be noted that the present study’s sample size is considerably large (N=345) and therefore offers 
sufficient statistical power to detect potentially meaningful relationships; the statistical findings 
are furthermore supported by the wide range of RF scores among participants (spanning from 
well below average to high scores). This varied distribution suggests that the “mental process by 
which an individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of himself or herself and 
others as meaningful on the basis of intentional mental states” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004) may 
not be directly affected by an individual’s narcissistic grandiosity.  Furthermore, the hypothesis 
that grandiose narcissists are worse at Self-Mentalizing than at Other-Mentalizing was not 
supported by the findings in this study. While disturbances in thinking about self and others are a 
hallmark in the definition of personality psychopathology, grandiose narcissistic beliefs might 
not be mediated through high or low levels of mentalization.  In other words, for some 
individuals, narcissistic symptom severity might be associated with high RF, whereas other 
pathologically grandiose individuals show low mentalizing capacity. The spectrum of RF found 
in this study suggests that self-aggrandizing behavior, manipulativeness and exploitative 
tendencies might be able to co-exist with varying degrees of focus on one’s own and the other’s 
intentional mental states.  
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In comparing the capacity for mentalization by using the Adult Attachment Interview 
(AAI) in a sample of adult female borderline patients with and without co-morbid narcissistic 
personality disorder, Diamond and colleagues (2013) found no significant difference in the RF 
scores, which was low in both groups (Diamond et al., 2013).  Interestingly enough, although the 
foregoing study only looked at NPD/BPD patients, the current study also found no significant 
differences in RF among the three variants of narcissism: vulnerable, grandiose and adaptive.   
These findings suggest that even in higher functioning NPD patients such as those 
characterized by adaptive narcissistic traits, better or more efficient defense use may devolve 
from factors other than RF, such as the empirically well established association with high self-
esteem (Lukowitsky et al., 2007; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1995; Watson et al., 1992; Sedikis et al., 
2004). 
 With respect to vulnerable narcissism the present study did reveal a limited relationship 
to RF, however, directionally this relationship indicated a positive correlation. Conceptually, this 
may make sense when considering that vulnerable narcissists were found to be anxiously 
attached individuals who are more likely to be worried about interpersonal rejection and 
abandonment. This tendency to cognitively and affectively anticipate interpersonal ‘worst-case-
scenarios,’ may incline these individuals to eagerly scan implicit or explicit signs of mental 
processes in oneself and others that indicate danger in the relational realm. This is consistent 
with Ronningstam’s (2009) picture of the vulnerable narcissist as someone who is hypervigilant 
and goes through life in an overly alert state of mind.   Still, given the limited nature of the 
relationship between narcissistic vulnerability and capacity for mentalization, further research is 
needed to substantiate these findings in clinical and non-clinical samples.   
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Adaptive narcissism was found to be negatively, but again weakly, related to reflective 
functioning in this study.  This is consistent with research on subclinical narcissism that shows 
that although the self-esteem component accounts for the link between normal narcissism and 
relative psychological health (Sedikides et al., 2004), high narcissists are interpersonally 
exploitative and abrasive and have an inflated sense of personal control over their environment 
(Watson, Sawrie, & Biderman, 1991).   Thus, self-awareness and self-regulation are derived 
from a largely unreflective need for power and status.  In contrast, the concept of mentalization 
as defined by Bateman and Fonagy (2004) concerns a more affectively and interpersonally 
complex understanding of oneself and others, requiring the understanding of other people’s 
behavior in terms of their likely thoughts and feelings  (Fonagy & Bateman, 2007).  The obtained 
results suggest the possibility that elevated levels of self-esteem and an almost compulsive need 
for achievement make the adaptive narcissist override the more complex processes involved in 
mentalization. 
 
6. Cross-cultural issues and Narcissism 
An individual’s personality is invariably shaped by cultural factors that are expressed 
through child-rearing practices, family values and customs, tradition and religious affiliations 
and the cultural specific development of coping mechanisms; one’s race-ethnicity contributes 
one of the crucial components of culture (Alarcon, Westermeyer, Foulks, Ruiz, 1999). The 
NESARC (National Epidemiological Survey on Alcohol and Related Conditions) was the first 
nationally representative study to examine the relationship between race-ethnicity and NPD 
(Grant, Moore, Shepherd, & Kaplan, 2003). The 2004-2005 Wave 2 NESARC found that Blacks 
had a greater prevalence of NPD than Whites in the overall sample and Hispanic women had a 
higher rate of NPD than white women (NESARC; Grant, Kaplan & Stinson, 2005). 
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In the current study, the participants’ pool was heterogeneous with respect to ethnic and 
racial diversity, but it should be noted that respondents from Hispanic (32%) and Asian (30%) 
background as well as young adults 18 to 25 years old were oversampled. This study did not find 
any statistical difference for pathological narcissism between African American, Asian and 
White participants. Interestingly, Asian respondents scored higher on vulnerable narcissism than 
African Americans. A similar pattern is noticeable with regard to adaptive narcissism with the 
highest mean scores held by African Americans and the lowest by Asian respondents (with 
Whites scoring in between).  These results seem to indicate that less pathological expressions of 
narcissism may at least partly grow out of attitudes regarded as culturally desirable by some 
ethnic groups but not by others. The current findings support observations made by Komarraju 
and Cokley (2008) who reported that African Americans had significantly greater horizontal 
individualism scores and lower horizontal collectivism scores than Whites, indicating that the 
individual’s uniqueness and specialness is particularly highly valued in the African American 
community.  Similarly, Foster, Campbell and Twenge (2003) found that self-identified White 
and Asian participants reported less narcissism than did either Black or Hispanic participants (the 
authors used the NPI, which corresponds to ‘adaptive narcissism’ in this study). These findings 
bring up interesting questions, including from a dynamic perspective. It might be that higher 
adaptive narcissism serves as a defensive but also protective factor that buffers an individual’s 
sense of security while also being increasingly accepted as a sign of personal strength by one’s 
cultural and ethnical group of belonging. Among more recent immigrants of Asian descent, 
anxiety over fulfilling parental expectations and gaining parental approval might outweigh more 
individualistic defensive styles.   
While the mechanism that might serve to explain the relatively higher narcissistic 
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vulnerability of Asian respondents in this study remain unclear, the present findings serve as 
reminder of the critical importance of cultural influences in psychiatric findings. The race-
ethnicity differences observed in this study might be a further impetus for efforts to better 
understand the interaction of cultural experience and narcissistic expression by encouraging 
further research in this area.  
 
7. Narcissism and Gender Differences 
Early on, the categorical emphasis on NPD’s grandiose criteria has generated concerns to 
what degree the DSM diagnosis can be generalized to women (Philipson, 1985; Perry & Perry, 
1996). More recently, theorists have proposed that the distinction between vulnerable and 
grandiose narcissism may divide along gender lines, with the grandiose type representing a 
stereotypical male narcissist and the vulnerable type representing a stereotypical female 
narcissistic patient (Levy et al., 2007).   
This study found no statistical difference of mean scores by gender across all three 
narcissistic expressions (grandiose, vulnerable and adaptive). Similarly, a small-scale (N=2053) 
epidemiological survey on personality disorders conducted in Oslo, Norway, did not yield any 
sex differences in the rates of NPD (Torgersen, Kringlen, & Cramer, 2001). However, the 
current findings are at variance with the NESARC Wave 2 study, which found a higher 
prevalence rate of NPD among men, a result that generalized across all age groups and among 
Whites and Blacks but not Hispanics (NESARC; Grant, Kaplan, &Stinson, 2005).  Keeping in 
mind the current study’s oversampling of young adults on the one hand and the ethnic 
homogeneity found in the Oslo study on the other hand, these inconsistent findings strongly 
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argue for future research on the influences of socio-demographic and cultural factors on gender 
differences in empirical studies on narcissism.  
 
8. Clinical Implications 
The present data supports a more differentiated picture of narcissism and thereby raises 
interesting questions on the ensuing clinical implications.  Research has shown that treatment 
utilization looks quite different for grandiose and vulnerable subtypes of narcissism, however, an 
even more complex picture emerges when the adaptive type is taken into account. In a study that 
examines pathological narcissism and use of psychotherapy, Pincus et al (2009) found that 
Grandiosity exhibited negative correlations with treatment utilization (low adherence to 
medication regimen, inpatient admissions, partial hospitalizations) while being positively related 
to outpatient therapy no-shows. In contrast, Vulnerability exhibited positive relations to the use 
of telephone-based crisis services, inpatient admissions, as well as outpatient treatment sessions 
attended or cancelled. These findings support the view that narcissistic patients are more likely to 
seek out treatment when they experience a vulnerable self-state (see also Pincus et al., 2009).   
However, more research on treatment utilization and narcissism is needed to parse apart 
the adaptive narcissist’s more healthy and protective self-functioning from the brittle ‘false-self’ 
personality construct of pathological narcissism.  For example, personality and social psychology 
researchers already use the term ‘normative narcissism’ to refer to individuals who combine high 
scores on narcissism (NPI) with good psychological health (defined by low dispositional 
neuroticism, depression and state anxiety versus high subjective well-being and couple well-
being). These so-called “would-be” narcissists report feeling well and not overly concerned by 
aversive social environments (Sedikis et al., 2004).  In this sense, adaptive narcissism represents 
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a personality style that is high on extraversion and manipulativeness while exhibiting outcome 
criteria high on self-esteem and assertiveness without the negative emotions associated with 
pathological narcissism (Miller at al., 2010).  
Similarly, the present study found no relationship between adaptive narcissism and 
general psychopathology or interpersonal difficulties. Further research is required to explore to 
what extent these findings may be qualified as a culturally syntonic phenomenon. Tentatively, 
one approach could take into account the discernable sociological shift in Western society’s 
values towards greater acceptance of individualistic goals (e.g. personal gain, status, open 
relationships, etc.) and competitive self-promotion. Individuals who most strongly embody these 
culturally accepted self-enhancement strategies may well present with disagreeableness 
(antagonistic, immodest, manipulative behavior) but may not qualify for the etiological pathways 
seen in clinical personality psychopathology.  These considerations may play a part in current 
NPD’s poor treatment utilization (early termination, high number of no-shows, etc.).  
As discussed in chapter 1, the original DSM rendering of personality disorders has been 
widely criticized for lacking an empirical foundation. As the soon-to-be published DSM-5 is 
slowly beginning to integrate clinical experience and empirical evidence, it is hoped that NPD’s 
revised diagnostic criteria will incorporate theory as well as research data in the attempt to 
strengthen narcissism’s clinical utility.  
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9. Limitations of the Study 
While the present study provides some promising data on the heterogeneity of narcissistic 
expressions, it is not without limitations.  First, it is important to note that the study’s working 
title “In what way are you special” is phrased in a way that might appeal to participants who 
aspire to be seen as special. This might have added a certain self-selective effect to the overall 
sample. At the same time, however, it should be noted that the online survey contained a de-
briefing section that clearly outlined the study’s research question. At this point, participants 
were offered the choice to have their data withdrawn and not to be included in this research.  
This study is further limited by the use of a non-clinical, undergraduate sample, from a 
predominantly lower middle class background, not screened for clinical disorders.  Even though, 
in a college sample the variance in the applied measures is expected to be lower than what one 
would expect to find in a clinical sample, the results may well apply to patient populations, 
because personality structure is essentially the same in clinical and non-clinical samples 
(O’Connor, 2002). College populations also have some methodological benefits in that there is a 
reduced likelihood of other psychiatric disorders that could account for results (Kendall, Hollon, 
Beck, Hammen & Ingram, 1987). Nevertheless, future work would benefit from testing the 
relationship among these variables in a less ethnically heterogeneous and/or affluent (middle and 
upper middle class) sample as well as in a clinical sample.  Furthermore the dependence on self-
report data with respect to personality pathology may be problematic because individuals with 
personality disorders are frequently unable to view themselves realistically (Klonsky & 
Oltmanns, 2002; Russ et al., 2008) and may have limited psychological insight  (Oltmanns & 
Turkheimer, 2006). The fact that questionnaire items tend to be worded more generally makes 
them also less liable to capture an individual’s unique presentation when compared to more 
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individually calibrated in-depth clinical interviews conducted by trained professionals. 
Respondents to self-reports may be tempted to purposefully portray a certain impression or may 
involuntarily deceive themselves in order to feel better about their self-presentation. While the 
examiner cannot control for these “built-in” disadvantages of self-report measures, the resulting 
interpretative limitations have been taken into account in the current study. 
 
Measurement Limitations: 
This study encountered some measurement limitations with regards to determining the 
participants’ RF level. Reflective functioning was measured by the RFQ-54, which assesses the 
ability to perceive and interpret human behavior in terms of intentional mental states. This scale 
is currently under development by Moulton-Perkins, Rogoff, Luyten and Fonagy (2011) and 
aims at facilitating the assessment of mentalization capacities through self-report, rather than via 
the lengthy clinician administered full Adult Attachment Interview (AAI).    Preliminary 
psychometric information based on an earlier 18-item version of this measure supports the 
internal consistency reliability of this abbreviated RFQ version. This was supported by the 
current study as the RFQ 54-item version internal consistency reliability proved satisfactory. 
However, this project found the scale’s convergent validity correlations to be problematic as 
mentalization impairment did not exhibit the expected negative correlations with a range of 
psychopathology validation measures. This may be partially due to the specific characteristics of 
the current sample (young age group, lower socio-economic background, immigration status). In 
any event, the current results are in contrast to findings by Perkins and her colleagues (2011) for 
the preliminary 18-item RFQ measure, which is supported by a moderately strong convergent 
construct validation with Empathy and Mindfulness and a equally moderately strong divergent 
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construct validation with BPD and general psychopathology. Noting that the psychometric 
properties of the RFQ merit further development, it is important to keep in mind that validation 
process for the newly developed RFQ-54 is still ongoing and convergent validity correlations for 
the 54-item version have not yet been published.  
 
Conclusion and Future Directions 
In this study RF did not correlate with pathological narcissism. In light of the ongoing 
effort to align DSM criteria for personality disorders with evidence based research, future 
research should continue to investigate the links between narcissistic pathology and disturbances 
in thinking about self and others.  This area of investigation seems particularly relevant in light 
of the newly introduced dimensional criteria for personality disorders in Section III of the DSM-
5 (APA, 2013).  
With regard to adult attachment, this study’s findings support the notion that narcissism 
of the vulnerable subtype is most predictive of attachment anxiety.  Further studies are needed to 
take a closer look at the contributing factors of this outcome, e.g. the degree of overlap of general 
personality traits from the Five-Factor Model of personality. This area of narcissism research 
seem particularly promising as the future DSM and ICD personality disorder classification 
already shows signs of moving into this direction.  
This study’s results with respect to narcissistic expressions across ethnic groups raise 
some very interesting questions and warrant a more in-depth post-hoc analysis on the interplay of 
the rise of narcissism in individual psychopathology and the variation of cultural values across 
racial lines. 
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 Overall, the present study’s findings lend support to the notion that each of the two 
pathological subtypes and the more adaptive form of narcissism manifest themselves quite 
differently in outcome measures.   Vulnerable narcissism exhibited the highest degree of general 
psychopathology and appears to establish the most sensitive response to interpersonal threats, 
whereas grandiose narcissism showed less pathological symptomatology and exhibited no direct 
relationship to attachment anxiety.  In contrast, adaptive narcissism did not predict elevated 
levels of general psychopathology and individuals who reported higher levels of adaptive 
narcissism were found to be slightly less, not more, anxious in their relationships.  
 These findings call attention to the noticeable nomological discrepancy between 
the three expressions of narcissism subject to this study. Despite their partial correlational 
overlap it remains unclear to what extent these three presentations of narcissism and narcissistic 
pathology are distinct phenotypes versus operating on a continuum. Naturally, evidence based 
diagnostic classification attempts are faced with new and challenging degrees of complexity, 
however, this should not act as a deterrent of future research into this fascinating realm of 
personality functioning.  
The model of personality disorder diagnosis as proposed by the DSM-5 Task Force on 
Personality and Personality Functioning allows for a more differentiated approach to clinical 
diagnosis that takes into account dimensional impairments of personality functioning and 
adaptive versus maladaptive trait expressions. The current findings support this approach and it 
is hoped that the inclusion of the proposed diagnostic model into Section III of the DSM-5 
(conditions designated for further study) will help spur future research in narcissistic personality 
disorders.  
  
	   100	  
APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Survey items “In what way are you special?” 
Demographics 
1. Are you male or female? 
2. What is your age? 
3. What is your current relationship status? 
4. What is your religious affiliation? 
5. What is your ethnicity? 
6. Are you currently in psychotherapy? 
7. What is your parents’ total household income?  
 
NPI (minus 7 E/E items, see below) 
1.  I have a natural talent for influencing people.  I am not good at influencing people. 
2.  Modesty doesn't become me.  I am essentially a modest person. 
3.  I would do almost anything on a dare.  I tend to be a fairly cautious person. 
4.  When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.  I know that I am 
good because everybody keeps telling me so. 
5.  The thought of ruling the world frightens the hell out of me.  If I ruled the world it 
would be a better place. 
6.  I can usually talk my way out of anything.  I try to accept the consequences of my 
behavior. 
7.  I prefer to blend in with the crowd.  I like to be the center of attention. 
8.  I will be a success.  I am not too concerned about success. 
9.  I am no better or worse than most people.  I think I am a special person. 
10.  I am not sure if I would make a good leader. I see myself as a good leader. 
11.  I am assertive.  I wish I were more assertive. 
12.  I like to have authority over other people.  I don't mind following orders. 
15.  I don't particularly like to show off my body.  I like to show off my body. 
16.  I can read people like a book.  People are sometimes hard to understand. 
17.  If I feel competent I am willing to take responsibility for making decisions.  I like 
to take responsibility for making decisions. 
18.  I just want to be reasonably happy.  I want to amount to something in the eyes of the 
world. 
19.  My body is nothing special.  I like to look at my body. 
20.  I try not to be a show off.  I will usually show off if I get the chance. 
21.  I always know what I am doing.  Sometimes I am not sure of what I am doing. 
22.  I sometimes depend on people to get things done.  I rarely depend on anyone else to get 
things done. 
23.  Sometimes I tell good stories.  Everybody likes to hear my stories. 
26.  Compliments embarrass me.  I like to be complimented. 
28.  I don't care about new fads and fashions.  I like to start new fads and fashions. 
29.  I like to look at myself in the mirror.  I am not particularly interested in looking at myself 
in the mirror. 
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30.  I really like to be the center of attention.  It makes me uncomfortable to be the center 
of attention. 
31.  I can live my life in any way I want to.  People can't always live their lives in terms 
of what they want. 
32.  Being an authority doesn't mean that much to me.  People always seem to recognize my 
authority. 
33.  I would prefer to be a leader.  It makes little difference to me whether I am a leader or 
not. 
34.  I am going to be a great person.  I hope I am going to be successful. 
35.  People sometimes believe what I tell them.  I can make anybody believe anything I want 
them to. 
36.  I am a born leader.  Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop. 
37.  I wish somebody would someday write my biography.  I don't like people to pry into 
my life for any reason. 





The Grandiosity Subscale contains 18 items (1,	  14,	  26,	  31,	  42,	  45,	  49, 4,	  10,	  15,	  23,	  35,	  6,	  22,	  25,	  33,	  39,	  43)	  	  
The Vulnerability Subscale contains 34 items (2,	  5,	  8,	  16,	  19,	  30,	  32,	  36,	  40,	  41,	  47,	  48,	  7,	  9,	  13,	  28,	  44,	  46,	  50,	  3,	  17,	  21,	  24,	  27,	  34,	  51,	  11,	  12,	  18,	  20,	  29,	  37,	  38,	  52) 
 ___	  	  1.	  	  	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  being	  admired	  and	  respected.	  ___	  	  2.	  	  	  My	  self-­‐esteem	  fluctuates	  a	  lot.	  ___	  	  3.	  	  	  I	  sometimes	  feel	  ashamed	  about	  my	  expectations	  of	  others	  when	  they	  disappoint	  me.	  ___	  	  4.	  	  	  I	  can	  usually	  talk	  my	  way	  out	  of	  anything.	  ___	  	  5.	  	  	  It’s	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  feel	  good	  about	  myself	  when	  I’m	  alone.	  ___	  	  6.	  	  	  I	  can	  make	  myself	  feel	  good	  by	  caring	  for	  others.	  ___	  	  7.	  	  	  I	  hate	  asking	  for	  help.	  ___	  	  8.	  	  	  When	  people	  don’t	  notice	  me,	  I	  start	  to	  feel	  bad	  about	  myself.	  ___	  	  9.	  	  	  I	  often	  hide	  my	  needs	  for	  fear	  that	  others	  will	  see	  me	  as	  needy	  and	  dependent.	  ___	  	  10.	  I	  can	  make	  anyone	  believe	  anything	  I	  want	  them	  to.	  ___	  	  11.	  I	  get	  mad	  when	  people	  don’t	  notice	  all	  that	  I	  do	  for	  them.	  ___	  	  12.	  I	  get	  annoyed	  by	  people	  who	  are	  not	  interested	  in	  what	  I	  say	  or	  do.	  ___	  	  13.	  I	  wouldn’t	  disclose	  all	  my	  intimate	  thoughts	  and	  feelings	  to	  someone	  I	  didn’t	  	  	  	  admire.	  	  ___	  	  14.	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  having	  a	  huge	  impact	  on	  the	  world	  around	  me.	  ___	  	  15.	  I	  find	  it	  easy	  to	  manipulate	  people.	  ___	  	  16.	  When	  others	  don’t	  notice	  me,	  I	  start	  to	  feel	  worthless.	  ___	  	  17.	  Sometimes	  I	  avoid	  people	  because	  I’m	  concerned	  that	  they’ll	  disappoint	  me.	  ___	  	  18.	  I	  typically	  get	  very	  angry	  when	  I’m	  unable	  to	  get	  what	  I	  want	  from	  others.	  ___	  	  19.	  I	  sometimes	  need	  important	  others	  in	  my	  life	  to	  reassure	  me	  of	  my	  self-­‐worth.	  ___	  	  20.	  When	  I	  do	  things	  for	  other	  people,	  I	  expect	  them	  to	  do	  things	  for	  me.	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___	  	  21.	  When	  others	  don’t	  meet	  my	  expectations,	  I	  often	  feel	  ashamed	  about	  what	  I	  	  	  	  wanted.	  ___	  	  22.	  I	  feel	  important	  when	  others	  rely	  on	  me.	  ___	  	  23.	  I	  can	  read	  people	  like	  a	  book.	  ___	  	  24.	  When	  others	  disappoint	  me,	  I	  often	  get	  angry	  at	  myself.	  ___	  	  25.	  Sacrificing	  for	  others	  makes	  me	  the	  better	  person.	  ___	  	  26.	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  accomplishing	  things	  that	  are	  probably	  beyond	  my	  means.	  
___  27. Sometimes I avoid people because I’m afraid they won’t do what I want them to  
  do. ___	  	  28.	  It’s	  hard	  to	  show	  others	  the	  weaknesses	  I	  feel	  inside.	  ___	  	  29.	  I	  get	  angry	  when	  criticized.	  ___	  	  30.	  It’s	  hard	  to	  feel	  good	  about	  myself	  unless	  I	  know	  other	  people	  admire	  me.	  ___	  	  31.	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  being	  rewarded	  for	  my	  efforts.	  
___  32. I am preoccupied with thoughts and concerns that most people are not interested  
  in me. ___	  	  33.	  I	  like	  to	  have	  friends	  who	  rely	  on	  me	  because	  it	  makes	  me	  feel	  important.	  ___	  	  34.	  Sometimes	  I	  avoid	  people	  because	  I’m	  concerned	  they	  won’t	  acknowledge	  what	  	  I	  do	  for	  them.	  ___	  	  35.	  Everybody	  likes	  to	  hear	  my	  stories.	  ___	  	  36.	  It’s	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  feel	  good	  about	  myself	  unless	  I	  know	  other	  people	  like	  me.	  ___	  	  37.	  It	  irritates	  me	  when	  people	  don’t	  notice	  how	  good	  a	  person	  I	  am.	  ___	  	  38.	  I	  will	  never	  be	  satisfied	  until	  I	  get	  all	  that	  I	  deserve.	  ___	  	  39.	  I	  try	  to	  show	  what	  a	  good	  person	  I	  am	  through	  my	  sacrifices.	  ___	  	  40.	  I	  am	  disappointed	  when	  people	  don’t	  notice	  me.	  ___	  	  41.	  I	  often	  find	  myself	  envying	  others’	  accomplishments.	  ___	  	  42.	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  performing	  heroic	  deeds.	  	  	  ___	  	  43.	  I	  help	  others	  in	  order	  to	  prove	  I’m	  a	  good	  person.	  ___	  	  44.	  It’s	  important	  to	  show	  people	  I	  can	  do	  it	  on	  my	  own	  even	  if	  I	  have	  some	  doubts	  inside.	  	  ___	  	  45.	  I	  often	  fantasize	  about	  being	  recognized	  for	  my	  accomplishments.	  ___	  	  46.	  I	  can’t	  stand	  relying	  on	  other	  people	  because	  it	  makes	  me	  feel	  weak.	  	  ___	  	  47.	  When	  others	  don’t	  respond	  to	  me	  the	  way	  that	  I	  would	  like	  them	  to,	  it	  is	  hard	  for	  me	  to	  still	  feel	  ok	  with	  myself.	  ___	  	  48.	  I	  need	  others	  to	  acknowledge	  me.	  ___	  	  49.	  I	  want	  to	  amount	  to	  something	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  world.	  ___	  	  50.	  When	  others	  get	  a	  glimpse	  of	  my	  needs,	  I	  feel	  anxious	  and	  ashamed.	  ___	  	  51.	  Sometimes	  it’s	  easier	  to	  be	  alone	  than	  to	  face	  not	  getting	  everything	  I	  want	  from	  other	  people.	  ___	  	  52.	  I	  can	  get	  pretty	  angry	  when	  others	  disagree	  with	  me.	  	  
 
 
Exploitation/Entitlement (E/E factor of NPI) 
13.  I find it easy to manipulate people.  I don't like it when I find myself manipulating 
people. 
14.  I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.  I usually get the respect that I 
deserve. 
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24.  I expect a great deal from other people.  I like to do things for other people. 
25.  I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.  I take my satisfactions as they come. 
27.  I have a strong will to power. Power for its own sake doesn't interest me. 
38.  I get upset when people don't notice how I look when I go out in public.  I don't mind 
blending into the crowd when I go out in public. 
39.  I am more capable than other people.  There is a lot that I can learn from other 
people. 
 
SCID-II PQ Cluster B 
1. Do you like to be the center of attention? 
2. Do you flirt a lot? 
3. Do you often find yourself “coming on” to people? 
4. Do you try to draw attention to yourself by the way you dress or look? 
5. Do you often make a point of being dramatic and colorful? 
6. Do you often change your mind about things depending on the people you are with or 
what you have just read or seen on TV? 
7. Do you have lots of friends you are very close to? 
8. Do people often fail to appreciate your very special talents or accomplishments? 
9. Have people told you that you have too high an opinion about yourself? 
10. Do you think a lot about the power, fame, or recognition that will be yours someday? 
11. Do you think a lot about the perfect romance that will be yours someday? 
12. When you have a problem, do you almost always insist on seeing the top person? 
13. Do you feel it is important to spend time with people who are special who are special and 
influential? 
14. Is it very important to you that people pay attention to you or admire you in some way? 
15. Do you think that it’s not necessary to follow certain rules or social conventions when 
they get in your way? 
16. Do you feel that you are the kind of person who deserves special treatment? 
17. Do you often find it necessary to step on a few toes to get what you want? 
18. Do you often have to put your needs above other people’s? 
19. Do you often expect other people to do what you ask without question because of who 
you are? 
20. Are you NOT really interested in other people’s problems or feelings? 
21. Have people complained that you don’t listen to them or care about their feelings? 
22. Are you often envious of others? 
23. Do you feel that others are often envious of you? 
24. Do you find that there are few people that are worth your time and attention? 
25. Have you often become frantic when you thought that someone you really cared about 
was going to leave you? 
26. Do your relationships with people you really care about have lots of extreme ups and 
downs? 
27. Have you all of a sudden changed your sense of who you are and where you are headed? 
28. Does your sense of who you are often change dramatically? 
29.  Are you different with different people or in different situations, so that you sometimes 
don’t know who you really are? 
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30. Have there been lots of sudden changes in your goals, career plans, religious beliefs, and 
so on? 
31. Have you done things impulsively? 
32. Have you tried to hurt or kill yourself or threatened to do so? 
33. Have you ever cut, burned or scratched yourself on purpose? 
34. Do you have a lot of sudden mood changes? 
35. Do you often feel empty inside? 
36. Do you often have temper outbursts or get so angry that you lose control? 
37. Do you hit people or throw things when you get angry? 
38. Do even little things get you very angry? 
39. When you are under a lot of stress, do you get suspicious of other people or feel 
especially spaced out? 
40. Before you were 15, would you bully or threaten other kids? 
41. Before you were 15, would you start fights? 
42. Before you were 15, did you hurt or threaten someone with a weapon, like a bat, brick, 
broken bottle, knife, or gun? 
43.  Before you were 15, did you deliberately torture someone or cause someone physical 
pain and suffering? 
44. Before you were 15, did you torture or hurt animals on purpose? 
45. Before you were 15, did you rob, mug, or forcibly take something from someone by 
threatening him or her? 
46. Before you were 15, did you force someone to have sex with you, to get undressed in 
front of you, or to touch you sexually? 
47. Before you were 15, did you set fires? 
48. Before you were 15, did you deliberately destroy things that weren’t yours? 
49. Before you were 15, did you break into houses, other buildings, or cars? 
50. Before you were 15, did you lie a lot or “con” other people? 
51. Before you were 15, did you sometimes steal or shoplift things or forge someone’s 
signature? 
52. Before you were 15, did you run away from home and stay away overnight? 
53. Before you were 13, did you often stay out very late, long after the time you were 
supposed to be home? 




1. I'm afraid that I will lose my partner's love. 
2. I often worry that my partner will not want to stay with me. 
3. I often worry that my partner doesn't really love me. 
4. I worry that romantic partners won’t care about me as much as I care about them. 
5. I often wish that my partner's feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him or her. 
6. I worry a lot about my relationships. 
7. When my partner is out of sight, I worry that he or she might become interested in someone 
else. 
8. When I show my feelings for romantic partners, I'm afraid they will not feel the same about 
me. 
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9. I rarely worry about my partner leaving me. 
10. My romantic partner makes me doubt myself. 
11. I do not often worry about being abandoned. 
12. I find that my partner(s) don't want to get as close as I would like. 
13. Sometimes romantic partners change their feelings about me for no apparent reason. 
14. My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away. 
15. I'm afraid that once a romantic partner gets to know me, he or she won't like who I really am. 
16. It makes me mad that I don't get the affection and support I need from my partner. 
17. I worry that I won't measure up to other people. 
18. My partner only seems to notice me when I’m angry. 
19. I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down. 
20. I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner. 
21. I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners. 
22. I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners. 
23. I don't feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners. 
24. I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners. 
25. I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close. 
26. I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner. 
27. It's not difficult for me to get close to my partner. 
28. I usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner. 
29. It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need. 
30. I tell my partner just about everything. 
31. I talk things over with my partner. 
32. I am nervous when partners get too close to me. 
33. I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners. 
34. I find it easy to depend on romantic partners. 
35. It's easy for me to be affectionate with my partner. 
36. My partner really understands me and my needs. 
 
 
BSI [5-point Likert scale] 
 
In the last week, how much were you distressed by: 
 
1. Nervousness or shakiness inside 
2. Faintness or dizziness 
3. The idea that someone else can control your thoughts 
4. Feeling others are to blame for most of your troubles 
5. Trouble remembering things 
6. Feeling easily annoyed or irritated 
7. Pains in heart or chest 
8. Feeling afraid in open spaces or on the streets 
9. Thoughts of ending your life 
10. Feeling that most people cannot be trusted 
11. Poor appetite 
12. Suddenly scared for no reason 
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13. Temper outbursts that you could not control 
14. Feeling lonely even though you are with people 
15. Feeling blocked in getting things done 
16. Feeling lonely 
17. Feeling blue 
18. Feeling no interest in things 
19. Feeling fearful 
20. Your feelings being easily hurt 
21. Feeling that people are unfriendly or dislike you 
22. Feeling inferior to others 
23. Nausea or upset stomach 
24. Feeling that you are watched or talked about by others 
25. Trouble falling asleep 
26. Having to check and double-check what you do 
27. Difficulty making decisions 
28. Feeling afraid to travel on buses, subways or trains 
29. Trouble getting your breath 
30. Hot or cold spells 
31. Having to avoid certain things, places or activities because they frighten you 
32. Your mind going blank 
33. Numbness or tingling in parts of your body 
34. The idea that you should be punished for your sins 
35. Feeling hopeless about the future 
36. Trouble concentrating 
37. Feeling weak in parts of your body 
38. Feeling tense or keyed up  
39. Thoughts of death or dying 
40. Having urges to beat, injure or harm someone 
41. Having urges to break or smash things 
42. Feeling very self conscious with others 
43. Feeling uneasy in crowds, such as shopping or at a movie 
44. Never feeling close to another person 
45. Spells of terror or panic 
46. Getting into frequent arguments 
47. Feeling nervous when you are left alone 
48. Others not giving you proper credit for your achievements 
49. Feeling so restless you couldn’t sit still 
50. Feelings of worthlessness 
51. Feeling that people will take advantage of you if you let them 
52. Feelings of guilt 
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Appendix 2: Consent Form 
CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK 
City College, Department of Psychology 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Project Title:  In what way are you special? 
 
Principal Investigator:  
 
Petra Vospernik, M.A., Graduate Student 
Clinical Psychology Doctoral Subprogram  
The City College of New York     
N.A.C. Building 8/107 
Convent Avenue at 138th Street 
Tel.: (212) 650-5674 
    
Faculty Advisor: 
 
Diana Diamond, Ph.D., Professor 
Clinical Psychology Doctoral Subprogram  
The City College of New York     
N.A.C. Building 8/106 
Convent Avenue at 138th Street 
Tel.: (212) 650-5662 
    
Site where study is to be conducted:  
The City College of the City University of New York, online survey administered through the 
Subject Pool that is administered by the Department of Psychology of City College. 
________________________________________ 
 
Introduction/Purpose: You are invited to participate in a research study. You have been invited 
because you are 18 years or older. The study is conducted under the direction of Petra Vospernik, 
M.A., Graduate Student, Clinical Psychology Doctoral Subprogram. The purpose of this research 
study is to gain a better understanding of the different ways in which people see themselves and 
are viewed by others. The survey will ask about ideas and feelings you have about yourself and 
others. It will also ask about how you would handle different situations in your daily life.  
 
Procedures:   
You can complete the online survey all at once, or you can go over parts of it, save your answers, 
and come back later to finish it. The entire survey should take about one hour to complete. Some 
of the questions in the survey will ask about your behaviors, including some you might find 
sensitive or personal You can skip questions you do not want to answer. This survey will not ask 
you for any identifiable information, so all of your answers will remain completely anonymous. 
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Possible Discomforts and Risks:  
It is possible that some study questions might make you uncomfortable. If a question makes you 
uncomfortable, and you want to speak to someone about it, you can contact the Wellness Center 
at City College, at 212-650-8222, to speak to one of their staff.  
 
Benefits: There are no direct benefits to participating in this study. Your participation, however, 
may be helpful in advancing the understanding of how our different ways of feeling special 
influence our lives.  
Compensation:  City University students who are in the subject pool will receive one credit for 
one hour of research participation in line with the policy of the Department of Psychology at City 
College.  To receive this credit, you will need to fill out a second and completely separate survey 
(“name survey”), which only asks your name. The “name survey” is NOT linked in any way to 
the research survey. Once your name has been sent to the City College Psychology Department 
for credit allocation, it will be deleted without recovery option. 
  
Alternative to Participation: 
Alternatives to participation in this study will be offered by your instructor.  However, at any 
time you can choose to not participate in this study.  
 
Confidentiality:  Once the study has been completed, the anonymous data collected will be 
stored for possible future research.  Participants are encouraged to protect their own 
confidentiality by completing this survey in a private setting. 
Voluntary Participation: Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may decide not to 
participate without prejudice, penalty, or loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 
Financial Considerations: Participation in this study will involve no cost to the subject.  
 
Contact Questions/Persons: If you have any questions about the research now or in the future, 
you should contact the Principal Investigator, Petra Vospernik at inwhatwayspecial@gmail.com.  
If you have any questions concerning your rights as a participant in this study, you may contact 
the IRB Administrator at 212-650-7902. 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above description of this research and I understand it.  I have been informed of 
the risks and benefits involved, and all my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  
Furthermore, I have been assured that any future questions that I may have will also be answered 
by the principal investigator of the research study.  I voluntary agree to participate in this study.  
 
Please indicate your consent by ‘clicking’ the box below: 
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Appendix 3: Debriefing 
Text of debriefing that appeared at the end of the research survey: 
Dear participant, 
Many thanks for taking part in this study. The study’s title “In what way are you special?” 
remained intentionally vague. The real purpose of the study is to better understand if and how 
people with different levels of narcissism are able to reflect on their own and others’ actions as 
well as their ability to form close relationships.  
“Normal narcissism” can be understood as the capacity to maintain a positive self-image through 
a realistic level of self-esteem that is derived from within as well as through interpersonal 
relationships and the social environment. 
In contrast, people with pathological levels of narcissism are overly invested in promoting their 
self-perceived superiority. They are also very sensitive to criticism and become easily aggressive. 
These people can only feel secure if they feel they are “better” than others, often alienating 
people along the way.  
Today, the majority of theorists and clinical researchers view narcissism on a continuum ranging 
from healthy to pathological expressions of this personality trait.  
The current study tries to contribute to a better understanding of the complex nature of 
narcissism. It was therefore necessary to keep the study title vague so as to ensure that 
participants answer questions as they truly apply to them.  I apologize for the intentional 
ambiguity of the study title and hope you understand that this was necessary in order to keep 
with the principles of scientific research. 
 
If you are interested in learning more about this topic, the following article is recommended as 
introductory reading: 
 
Cain, N. M., Pincus, A. L., & Ansell, E. B. (2008). Narcissism at the crossroads: Phenotypic 
description of pathological narcissism across clinical theory, social/personality psychology, and 
psychiatric diagnosis. Clinical Psychology Review, 28, 638 – 656. 
 
Please remember that your answers to this survey will remain completely anonymous. In any 
case, following this further information about the study, you now have a choice to either 
continue or withdraw from the study by clicking one of two boxes below:  
 
[box] Withdraw from the study 
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